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By DAVID HORTON*
A GROWING NUMBER of personal injury litigants stand outside the
contours of tort law. Plaintiffs who are hurt while engaging in high
risk recreational activities do not fit within a doctrine that uses "rea-
sonableness" as its central criterion. Reasonableness hinges on
whether the cost of an untaken precaution outweighs that of a particu-
lar harm.1 In many risky sports, the only way to avoid getting hurt is to
forego the activity altogether. For most people, this is not a burden.
Even if it is, the lost opportunity value is dwarfed by the omnipresent
specter of grave injury. For example, consider the sport of motocross,
which involves racing and performing stunts on off-road motorcycles. 2
Motocross is so dangerous that midway through the professional cir-
cuit's most recent season, half of its contestants had suffered broken
bones or concussions.3 Thus, the reasonably prudent person would
probably never try the sport.4 However, if it is unreasonable to take
part in motocross, then it must also be unreasonable for a motocross
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1. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
2. See, e.g., A Motor Sport Takes Off Leaving a Trail of Broken Bones, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2002, at Al0 [hereinafter Motor Sport].
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A
Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 216-17 (1987) (flagging the issue) [hereinafter
Simons, Full Preference]; David Horton, Comment, Rethinking Assumption of Risk and Sports
Spectators, 51 UCLA L. REv. 339, 364 n.151 (2003) ("[T]ort law, grounded in the objective
reasonable person standard, simply does not deal well with idiosyncratic plaintiffs who ac-
tively seek thrills through dangerous, socially sanctioned activities.").
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track owner to offer the plaintiff the opportunity to do so. 5 Risky
sports defy classification under tort law's fundamental norm.
But for people like Travis Pastrana, a professional motocross com-
petitor, even the most dangerous sports are reasonable. Pastrana be-
gan riding at the age of four.6 Two years later, a crash temporarily
paralyzed him.7 Shortly after recovering, he got back on his bike. 8 By
his eighteenth birthday, he had endured ten concussions, undergone
twelve operations, and broken more than thirty bones. 9 When asked
about his injuries, he replied: "Every time I've gotten hurt . .. has
been worth it."10 Indeed, for "risk-preferrers" like Pastrana, not only
are dangerous sports worthwhile despite their risks, but they are
worthwhile because of their risks. Risk-preferrers invert the negligence
equation: for them, the greater the risk, the greater the benefit. Yet
while Pastrana's accidents are "worth it" to him, whether the value of
motocross outweighs its costs as a normative matter is less clear. Al-
though "[m]aking one's own choices about risk ... is an important
aspect of individual autonomy[J,]" t few activities that injure so fre-
quently are reasonable under traditional negligence principles.1 2
For years, this theoretical problem had little pragmatic signifi-
cance. If an injured sports participant filed suit, the business entity
that provided the activity would invoke the affirmative defense of as-
sumption of risk. Traditionally, assumption of risk barred a plaintiffs
claim-whether his behavior was reasonable or unreasonable-on the
5. See Simons, Full Preference, supra note 4, at 217.
6. See KIDZWORLD, SPORTS ZONE-EXTREME SPORTS, MOTORCROSS TRAvis PASTRANA, at
http://www.kidzworld.com/site/p1739.htm (last accessed March 18, 2004).
7. See Anne Arundel, Names in the News, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at T4. Pastrana
fell during a 120-foot-long jump. The force of the impact drove his spinal column through
his pelvis. See Motor Sport, supra note 2.
8. See Arundel, supra note 7. Pastrana soon earned notoriety by riding his motorcycle
into the Grand Canyon. See Lynn Hoppes, Pastrana Still Ailing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 14,
2003, at D14, 2003 WL 11318237.
9. See Motor Sport, supra note 2.
10. See id. Pastrana's statement provoked an angry reply. See Letter to the Editor, The
Cost of a Sport, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at A22 ("We are mired in a national crisis over how
to pay for basic health care and cannot afford the costs of self-inflicted inju-
ries .... Perhaps those who are footing the bill should decide if his stunts are 'worth it."').
11. Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J.
1, 3 (1993).
12. See Simons, Full Preference, supra note 4, at 234 ("Often it is simply impossible to say
whether or not risk-preferring conduct is negligent."). Many extreme sports luminaries
have medical histories that mirror Pastrana's. At the 2001 X Games in Philadelphia, Cary
Hart fell thirty-five feet during a mid-air flip, shattering three ribs, his tailbone, and his
right foot. See Kevin Van Valkenburg, Something They're Really lipping Over, BALT. SUN, Aug.
20, 2002, at ID, 2002 WL 6966811.
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ground that he voluntarily chose to encounter a known danger.'3
However, assumption of risk partially overlapped with the doctrine of
contributory negligence, which completely precluded recovery if the
plaintiff engaged in unreasonable conduct.14 Recently, most jurisdic-
tions replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence,
which apportions damages according to fault. Thus, assumption of
risk's viability has become one of the most unsettled areas of tort
law-an issue so complex that the drafters of the Second Restatement of
Torts dubbed it "The Battle of the Wilderness."1 5 In the wake of this
change, the existence and scope of a commercial recreation vendor's
liability exposure depends on a complex web of specialized duty rules,
sports-specific exculpatory statutes, and contractual waivers.
Sailing full steam toward these choppy waters is one of the most
dramatic sociological transformations of our time: the "extreme
sports" phenomenon. 16 Once dismissed as the province of a few fool-
hardy individuals,'7 high risk recreational activities have now become
ubiquitous in advertising,' 8 television,1 9 and film. 20 Participation in
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
14. See id. § 463.
15. See Foronda v. Hawaii Int'l Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 834 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001).
16. For articles chronicling the rise of extreme sports, see Michael Angeli, Inside the
Extreme Machine, PLAYBOy, Nov. 1, 1997, at 82, 1997 WL 9309409; Mike Bresnahan, X Games
in Los Angeles: Avoiding Injury Is Most Difficult Stunt to Pull Off L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at
DI; Karl Taro Greenfeld, Life on the Edge, TIME, Sept. 6, 1999, at 28; Robert Johnson, Ex-
treme-Sports Industry Faces Risky New Challenge, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2001, at B2; Brendan I.
Koerner, Extreeeme: The Peril, the Thrill, the Sheer Rebellion of It All, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 30, 1997, at 50, 1997 WL 8332292; James Parker, Zen and the Art of Stunt Riding: How
America Became Safe for Extremism, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan 19, 2003, at D2, 2003 WL 3375534;
Paula Parrish, Going to Extremes; For Daredevils Who Cheat Death, the Risks are Right up There
with the Rewards, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 22, 2002, at D1, 2002 WL 9104168; Paula
Span, Insanely Sick, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at W14, 2002 WL 24827290; Karen Thomas,
Going to the Extreme: Young Daredevils Zip into Mainstream, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1997, at Al,
1997 WL 7010476; Dennis Tuttle, On the Cutting Edge; Radical Sports Find a Foothold, WASH.
POST, Jan. 11, 1998, atY6, 1998 WL 2461271.
17. See, e.g., Charles Stein, X Marks the Sport, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 1998, at 1, 1998
WL 9149722 ("Once, it was 'those kids' who went to extremes. Now, it is 'our kids,' the
same ones who play Little League and soccer."); see alsoJennifer Gabriel, Crazy for Sports,
KANSAS CITY STAR, Aug. 7, 1997, at El, 1997 WiL 3020998 ("[P]eople who participated in
these activities [once] weren't called athletes. They were called crazy.").
18. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Homicide on Holiday: Prosecutorial Discretion, Popular Culture,
and the Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1641, 1647 (2003) (noting the
success of Old Spice and Nissan's extreme-sports-themed advertising campaigns); Colin
Grimshaw, Sports Marketing: Living Dangerously, REUTERS, Mar. 29, 2002, at 35, 2002 WL
9473113 (noting that Audi, Honda, Nissan, Volvo, Motorola, Davidoff, and Nokia are spon-
soring mountain-biking, in-line skating, snowboarding, and windsurfing events); Koerner,
supra note 16, at 7 (mentioning Mountain Dew's and Pringles's advertising campaigns);
Kathleen Nelson, Increasingly Extreme, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, May 22, 2002, at D1, 2002
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sports such as skydiving, bungee jumping, rock climbing, hang glid-
ing, motocross, BMX, snowboarding, wake-boarding, kite-boarding,
and skateboarding has soared in the last decade. 21 This movement has
been driven largely by youth culture. 22 While participation in team
sports declined by a quarter in the last decade, the number of teenag-
WL 2564547 (commenting that Nestea, Hershey's, Mr. Coffee, Tyco, and Saturn have all
hired snowboarders as spokespeople); Span, supra note 16 (adding Chevrolet, AT&T, Taco
Bell, Jeep, Circuit City, and the Marine Corps to the list).
19. See Leslie Earnest, Sports-Apparel Makers Angling to Get 'Big Air' Time on Fox, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at C1 (describing 54321, a Fox News show that focuses on extreme
sports); Fox Entertainment Group, Inc.: New Cable Channel Will Focus on Extreme Sports, WALL
ST.J., Dec. 5, 2002, at B10; Malcolm Mayhew, Hollywood Gets X-TREME: Action Sports Grab the
Big-Screen Spotlight with Movies Like 'Extreme Ops' and 'XXX,' FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Nov. 29, 2002, 2002 WL 103707468; Nelson, supra note 18 (detailing EXPN, a specialty
cable channel devoted entirely to extreme sports).
20. See BLUE CRUSH (Universal 2002) (telling the story of aspiring female surfers); DIE
ANOTHER DAY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2002) (opening with a team of secret agents surfing
to shore in hostile territory at night); DOGTOWN AND Z Boys (Sony 2001) (documenting
skateboarding's early history); EXTREME OPS (Apollo Media 2002) (involving a team of
extreme sports experts who encounter terrorists while making a commercial); GRIND
(Warner Bros. 2003 (following a group of skateboarders); STEP INTO LIQUID (Artisan 2003)
(profiling various extreme surfers); XXX (Columbia Pictures 2002) (featuring a
snowboarding, BASEjumping super-spy). Extreme sports have also been the subject of two
IMAX films. See ADRENALINE RUSH: THE SCIENCE OF RISK (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2003); UL-
TIMATE X (ESPN 2002).
21. For example, membership in the United States Parachute Association has in-
creased by more than thirty percent in the last ten years. SeeJim Lockwood, Skydivers Don't
Want State Jumping Hastily, N.J. STAR-LEDGER, July 6, 2003, at 25. Half a million Americans
rock climb. See Koerner, supra note 16. Participation in snowboarding has increased two-
and-a-half times; the activity emerged from obscurity to become an Olympic sport. See Mike
Bresnahan, TV Making Leap to Extreme Sports, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at E12. BMX will
also be a medal sport at the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. See Ryan Clark, BMX Racing: A
Wheel-Life Fantasy, WASH. PosT, Aug. 3, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL 56510417. Skateboarding is
the fastest-growing sport in the United States. See C. Woodrow Irvin, The Great Skate Debate,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2002, at T20. Motocross, which involves racing and performing tricks
on off-road motorcycles, is the second-most popular spectator sport in the country. See
Motor Sport, supra note 2; Chris Ballard, American Idols, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 20, 2003, at
11, 2003 WL 8586155 (noting that American Motocross Events draw an average of 49,566
fans per event). In addition, the overwhelming success of ESPN's X Games-an extreme
sports competition modeled on the Olympics-has spawned a series of similar events, in-
cluding Tony Hawk's Boom-Boom Huckjam, the Gravity Games, the Taz Fair, and the
Warped Tour. See Marcia Manna, Airheads, S.D. UNIoN-TRIB., June 13, 2002, at NC1, 2002
WL 4608124.
22. For example, the X Games drew more teenage viewers last year than the Super
Bowl, the World Series, or the World Cup. See Nelson, supra note 18. In addition, teenagers
rated skateboarder Tony Hawk as the most popular male athlete-ahead of such sports
luminaries as Shaquille O'Neil, Tiger Woods, DerekJeter, and Michael Jordan. See id. Iron-
ically, Hawk is often described as "the Michael Jordan of skateboarding." See, e.g., Tim
Layden, What Is This 34year-Old Man Doing on a Skateboard? Making Millions, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, June 10, 2002, at 80. Hawk's licensing deals with Adio Shoes, Bagel Bites, Hot
Wheels, and Activision generate an estimated $250 million in annual sales. See id.
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ers who skateboard, snowboard, or in-line skate increased more than
five times.2 3 In addition, unlike team sports, where even the best play-
ers must wait years before turning professional, many pubescent
skateboarders, motocross riders, wake-boarders, and BMXers are ink-
ing lucrative deals with sponsors.24 For these reasons, commentators
are beginning to acknowledge what once would have been unthink-
able-that extreme sports will soon replace recreational staples like
baseball, basketball, and football.25 Indeed, Americans spend $40 bil-
lion each year on sporting goods,26 and the extreme sports industry
has "captured an expanding piece of th(is] pie." 27 Because extreme
sports are often sponsored by corporations 28 and municipalities 29-
deep-pocket entities-some fear that America stands on the brink of a
23. See Nelson, supra note 18. More children currently skateboard than play baseball.
See Irvin, supra note 21. In 2002, sporting goods stores sold more skateboards than baseball
gloves. See Ross Siler, The X-Factor Once a Curiosity, X Games Now an Extreme Player, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 14, 2003, 2003 WL 5682964. Just six percent of skateboarders are older than
twenty-five. See Colleen Jenkins, A Skate-Park Sign of the Times: Boomer on Board, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 2002, at A12.
24. For example, Dylan Oliver garnered national attention by receiving corporate
sponsorship at the age of four. See Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 22, 2003),
2003 WL 4859999; The Next Big Little Thing Forward, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, June 1,
2003, 2003 WL 18300314; see also Margaret Talbot, Why Isn't He the Cutest Brand-Image En-
hancer You've Ever Seen?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 21, 2003, at 32, 2003 WL 75231627
(noting that Luke Mitrani, a thirteen-year-old snowboarder, is under contract with Moun-
tain Dew and that Mitchie Brusco, a six-year-old skateboarder, is sponsored by Jones Soda
and Lego); Span, supra note 16 (explaining that seventeen-year-old professional
skateboarder Kyle Beard "already outearns his father"); Hoppes, supra note 8 (hailing the
success of thirteen-year-old Phillip "Froggy" Soven); James Whitters, Wallenda on Wheels Is
Only 7: Boy Can Fly Through Bike Stunts Few Older Riders Would Attempt, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
31, 2003, at 1, 2003 WL 3416209 (describing Nick Rogatkin, a sponsored seven-year-old
freestyle BMX rider); Dan Arritt, From Extreme to Mainstream, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 2003, at 14
(profiling sixteen-year-old wake-boarder Dallas Friday); Peter Yoon & Rob Fernas, X Games
in Los Angeles: Winners Get Even Younger, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at D13 (featuring thir-
teen-year-old Ryan Sheckler, the youngest skateboarding gold medalist in X Games
history).
25. See, e.g., Koerner, supra note 16 ("'Sports that involve speed, variety, and change
will replace [team sports].'" (quoting Temple University Professor Frank Farley)); Mau-
reen Tkacik, Foothold: As Extreme Goes Mass, Nike Nips at a Skate-Shoe Icon, WALL ST. J., Apr.
24, 2002, at Al (commenting that Rick Anguilla, Nike's director of brand communications,
predicts that "in a few years, the kid who plays Little League baseball is going to be consid-
ered 'alternative'").
26. See Koerner, supra note 16.
27. Ramsey, supra note 18, at 1647.
28. Indeed, "[e]xtreme sports are big business," and providing them to the public has
become a thriving industry. Kate Linebaugh, Bankers on the Run in Asia, SEATrLE TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2003, at C3, 2003 WL 3620148; Tkacik, supra note 25; Jorge Sanchez, Extreme Fun:
The Business of Playtime, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at 1, 2003 WL 102917897;
Rachel Wimberly, Sport Taking Off: Extreme Sports Gain Popularity, Profit Potential, DALLAS
MORNING STAR, June 8, 2003, at El, 2003 WL 57132919.
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spike in tort litigation. 30 Surprisingly, though, contemporary assump-
tion of risk doctrine has generated little scholarly attention, 31 and no
commentator has addressed the issue of extreme sports and assump-
tion of risk in depth. 32
This Article contends that extreme sports accentuate flaws in
modern assumption of risk doctrine. Many jurisdictions now apply a
doctrine called "primary assumption of risk" to the sports setting.
33
Primary assumption of risk frees defendants from a duty to protect
29. Municipalities have opened over six hundred new skate parks in the past two
years. See Nelson, supra note 18 (calling skate parks "the baseball and softball diamonds of
the 21st Century"); Span, supra note 16 (noting that sports marketing executives predict
that most shopping malls will have a skate park within the decade). There are an estimated
1,800 skate parks in the United States currently. SeeAaron Kahn, The Air Apparent, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 18, 2003, at IA, 2003 WL 2620545. ESPN recently opened skate parks
in five cities that bear the X Games brand. See Shira Springer, X Games Grow Up: ESPN
Turned Mainstream on to Extreme BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at CI, 2002 WL 4144067.
Cities find skate parks attractive because they funnel teenagers away from skating in public
places. See Sheila McLaughlin, Skaters To Get a Place to Play, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 21,
2003, at B3, 2003 WL 55042909; Nancy Maes, On a Roll: Growth in Skate Parks Meet Needs of
Extremely Active Users, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 2000, at 57, 2003 WVL 3696011 (attributing skate
parks' popularity to the fact that "adults have long been looking for ways to corral pre-
teens and teens with activities that sparked their interest").
30. See, e.g., Nancy C. Rodriguez, Skate Park Users Lobby to Keep Site Open, Free, Louis-
VILLE COURIER-J., July 31, 2002, at 4B (detailing a proposal to privatize a municipal-owned
skate park due to liability concerns after a near-fatal accident involving an eleven-year-old
bicyclist).
31. Two exceptions are Stephen D. Sugarman, The Monsanto Lecture: Assumption of
Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 836 (1997) (contending that courts should eliminate assump-
tion of risk as an independent concept) [hereinafter Sugarman, Assumption of Risk] and
Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481, 483 (2002)
(reiterating an earlier claim that assumption of risk should be a total bar to recovery in two
limited circumstances) [hereinafter Simons, Reflections].
32. Although Professor Simons notes the issue-asking "[w]ould the reasonably pru-
dent person ever try the experimental sport of hang gliding?"-he only mentions it in
passing. See Simons, Full Preference, supra note 4, at 234; see also Ramsey, supra note 18 (dis-
cussing assumption of risk and extreme sports for the limited purpose of arguing that
criminal law is expanding to areas that were once only governed by tort).
33. Despite the "assumption of risk" label, some jurisdictions have made it clear that
the no duty rule is now just part of the plaintiffs prima facie case. See, e.g., Foronda v.
Hawaii Int'l Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 837 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001). However, courts in other
states are still confused over whether primary assumption of risk is merely run-of-the-mill
duty analysis or whether it remains an affirmative defense. Compare Kahn v. E. Side Union
High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 51 (Cal. 2003) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
state has "abolished assumption of risk as an affirmative defense to a negligence action")
with Moser v. Ratinoff, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 201-202 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[A] defense to a
claim of negligence is that the plaintiff either expressly or impliedly assumed the risk.").
This issue determines whether plaintiffs or defendants bear burdens of pleading and
proof. See, e.g., Simons, Reflections, supra note 31, at 486 n.17 (2002).
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plaintiffs from a sport's inherent risks.3 4 However, defendants do owe
a duty not to "increase" these risks.3 5 Although courts have articulated
several different conceptual rationales for the no duty rule, they have
not noticed subtle differences between these principles. Teasing out
these distinctions elucidates that the no duty rule is founded on a se-
ries of assumptions that do not apply to high risk recreational
activities.
For one, some courts apparently believe that the no duty rule is
necessary because all sports are inherently reasonable. 36 This stance
presupposes that the social value of any particular sport outweighs its
risks. Nevertheless, while this may be true for many recreational activi-
ties, it is likely not so for a sport like motocross, which injures partici-
pants at "astonishing levels. '" 3 7
Another perspective is that the no duty rule represents a policy
judgment that it is better to allow sports to continue unchanged than
to impose safety measures that might fundamentally alter their na-
ture.3 8 Courts that adhere to this-position claim that the no duty rule
is necessary because the benefits and dangers of many sports are con-
nected. 39 For example, basketball is worthwhile because it involves ex-
ercise, competition, and rapid movement; yet these aspects of the
sport also cause injuries. Because it would lessen basketball's social
value to eliminate these risks, the no duty rule does not force defend-
ants to do so. This is a more radical view of the no duty rule. Because
it shields conduct that would otherwise be unreasonable from liability,
it confers a subsidy upon sports participants and vendors. Yet, unlike
traditional recreational activities which feature socially valuable con-
duct that happens to carry with it attendant risks, the primary virtue of
many extreme sports is that they allow participants to make the auton-
34. Of course, the existence of a duty is a prerequisite to a tort suit. When deciding
whether to impose a duty, courts engage in a rather complex analysis that considers the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk-that is, its foreseeability and severity-
and the impact the imposition of a duty would have on public policy. Recognition of a duty
of care, ultimately, rests on considerations of public policy and on notions of fairness.
Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372,
376 (N.J. 1994)).
35. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992) (plurality decision).
36. See, e.g., Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812, 817 (Ct. App.
1996) (explaining that the no duty rule flows from the fact that "football [i]s played and
enjoyed by thousands").
37. Motor Sport, supra note 2.
38. See, e.g., Wattenbarger v. Cincinnati Reds, Inc., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 735-37 (Ct.
App. 1994).
39. See, e.g., Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 ("[C]onditions or conduct that otherwise might
be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself.").
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omous decision to wager life and limb. Extending the no duty rule to
such activities therefore subsidizes pure risk-taking.
The fact that extreme sports cannot be deemed either reasonable
or unreasonable creates a further complication. When a defendant's
breach of duty injures a plaintiff, the jury should award full damages
unless the plaintiff has also been negligent. Extreme sports often hurt
people who have not been careless at all. Thus, the only possible basis
for reducing an extreme sport participant's damages often will be the
bare decision to engage in the activity. As a result, the no duty rule
poses a Hobson's choice: either reducing the plaintiff's damages in
contravention of the overarching principle that tort law should deter
only unreasonable behavior or allowing the plaintiff full recovery de-
spite the fact that he purposely placed himself in harm's way. In order
to deal with the issue, some state supreme courts and legislatures
claim that a jury may lower a plaintiffs damages based on the choice
to take part in a dangerous activity even if it determines that the deci-
sion was reasonable. 40 But this position proves untenable upon close
inspection. Indeed, two years after the Washington Supreme Court
made such a claim, an intermediate appellate court in that state sim-
ply disagreed. 41
Finally, several states employ primary assumption of risk when the
plaintiff engages in conduct that reveals that he has consented to face
dangers created by the defendant. Yet this "implied consent" ap-
proach creates its own anomalies. When applied to minors-an essen-
tial element of the extreme sports movement-the consensual
approach imputes an agreement to relieve the defendant from liability
on behalf of a party who could void any express arrangement made in
contract. In fact, some jurisdictions require the same elements of
proof for primary assumption of risk and contractual liability waivers,
leaving vendors with no means to bar the claims of child plaintiffs.
This Article proposes a subtle doctrinal shift that would bring
high risk recreational activities back within the negligence concept
and provide vendors with a dependable basis for barring claims. Be-
cause common law tort rules offer little guidance, purveyors of recrea-
tional activities increasingly rely on waivers as a means of protecting
themselves from liability. Yet courts often find such agreements unen-
forceable as a matter of contract law. Therefore, this Article advocates
giving waivers independent tort significance. Business entities that
40. See id. at 706; Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 290-91 (Wash. 1987).
41. See Leyendecker v. Cousins, 770 P.2d 675, 678-79 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
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provide extreme sports should be held to an additional duty to take
reasonable steps to inform patrons of an activity's dangers. Although
the duty to inform would have little effect on the day-to-day opera-
tions of vendors, many of whom already take elaborate steps to warn
patrons, it would bring extreme sports back within the reasonableness
concept. A fully-informed plaintiffs decision to engage in an extreme
sport indicates that, for him, the benefits of the activity outweigh its
risks. Warnings would thus allow businesses to cater only to those peo-
ple who find such activities to be reasonable. By limiting the availabil-
ity of a risky activity only to those who truly prefer to face its dangers,
defendant businesses would ensure that they too are operating on the
right side of the negligence line. Indeed, tort law recognizes an analo-
gous concept in similar contexts: the doctrine of informed consent in
medicine and the duty of manufacturers of dangerous products to
provide warnings.4 2
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains why the tradi-
tional assumption of risk doctrine was so problematic. It reveals that
courts often claimed to apply the defense when their reasoning sug-
gested another basis for barring the plaintiffs claim: that he was con-
tributorily negligent, that the defendant owed him no duty of care, or
that the defendant simply never engaged in unreasonable conduct.
Part I then explicates the current state of the law. It shows that the
patchwork of doctrines that have replaced the traditional assumption
of risk defense-including the no duty rule, liability releases, and
sport-specific inherent risk statutes-fail to provide recreational activ-
ity purveyors with a trustworthy means to insulate themselves from
liability.
Part II explains how extreme sports expose the weaknesses in the
no duty rule's doctrinal edifice. This Part first details why high risk
recreational activities are so difficult to analyze under the negligence
formula. It then explores the ramifications of this problem. The fact
that extreme sports resist classification under tort law's basic standard
belies the reasonableness rationale for the no duty rule and casts
doubt on the propriety of subsidizing conduct that may inflict a net
loss on society. It has also led courts to reach wildly different conclu-
sions about what it means to "increase" an extreme sport's inherent
risks. In addition, it has forced courts to grapple with how to appor-
tion damages between a negligent defendant and a plaintiff who has
engaged in risky but not necessarily unreasonable behavior-a ques-
42. See infra Part II.A.3.
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tion to which there is no adequate answer. Part II then explicates the
clash between the traditional contractual protections accorded to mi-
nors and the "implied consent"justification for primary assumption of
risk.
Part III begins by offering a definition of "extreme sports." It then
argues that assimilating such activities into the reasonableness para-
digm would create a doctrinal framework that is consistent with the
policy justifications for the no duty rule. Grounding the no duty rule
in informed consent would also allow courts to defensibly apply it to
plaintiffs of all ages and risky recreational activities of all stripes. Fi-
nally, the duty to inform would eliminate the need for fact-finders to
apportion damages between negligent and non-negligent behavior.
Instead, juries would evaluate two related forms of conduct: the rea-
sonableness of a vendor's efforts to inform a plaintiff of an activity's
risks and the reasonableness of the plaintiffs decision to engage in
the activity.
I. The Evolution of the Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
A. The Traditional Assumption of Risk Defense
The traditional doctrine of assumption of risk sounds simple: "[a]
plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negli-
gent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such
harm. '43 Yet scholars have long regarded assumption of risk as being
"more difficult to understand and apply than almost any other [doc-
trine] in the law of torts."44 The confusion stemmed from the fact that
judges used the assumption of risk label to signify several discrete le-
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
44. John Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17, 17 (1961),
stating:
The phrase "assumption of risk" is an excellent illustration of the extent to which
uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expres-
sion; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a
legal formula, undiscriminatingly [sic] used to express different and sometimes
contradictory ideas.
See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959) ("Assumption of
risk is a term of several meanings."); Fleming James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141,
169 (1952) ("[T]he term and the concept should be abolished"); W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R.E. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 68, at 480 (5th ed.
1984) (assumption of risk "has been surrounded by much confusion"); Knight v. Jewett,
834 P.2d 696, 699 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion) ("As every leading tort treatise has ex-
plained, the assumption of risk doctrine long has caused confusion both in definition and
application, because the phrase 'assumption of risk' traditionally has been used in a num-
ber of very different factual settings involving analytically distinct legal concepts.");
Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, supra note 31, at 834 (calling assumption of risk a "doctrinal
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gal concepts. 45 First, assumption of risk bore a strong resemblance to
the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, which precluded
recovery when the plaintiffs conduct fell below the standard of a rea-
sonable person. 46 Because voluntarily choosing to encounter a known
danger was often unreasonable, and because both contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk were complete defenses to liability,
courts had no reason to distinguish between the two doctrines.47
Second, some courts applied assumption of risk to recurring situ-
ations with well-known risks-for example, cases in which baseball
spectators were injured by foul balls-even where there was no evi-
dence that the particular plaintiff actually realized that he was in a
hazardous situation. Instead, these courts reasoned, any plaintiff
would have come to that conclusion. 48 Although these courts claimed
to apply assumption of risk, their wholesale determinations that an
entire class of plaintiffs should not recover are better described as
finding that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of care. 49 In-
deed, the same fact-that an activity was dangerous-could cause a
court either to hold a defendant to no duty of care or to bar a plain-
tiffs claim under assumption of risk.50 Finally, courts also claimed to
muddle [which] ... is confusing, unnecessary, and if we are not careful .... will lead us to
the wrong outcome").
45. See Tiller v. Ad. Coast Line Ry., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 cmt. d (1965) ("The great majority of
the cases involving assumption of risk have ... overlap[ped] contributory negligence.").
This occurred "where the known risk of harm is great relative to the utility of plaintiffs
conduct." Id. at cmt. c.; Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P.2d 369, 373 (Idaho 1985) ("Many courts
in non-comparative negligence settings have used both defenses interchangeably without
attempting to distinguish between the two.").
48. See Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W. 368, 371 (Tex. App. 1941) (barring
claim of forty-two year old baseball spectator who had never been to a game before on the
grounds that her son must have "handled baseballs in and around his house, under the
watchful eye of his mother" thereby making her aware of "the potential dangers inherent
in a baseball in play").
49. See STEVEN SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.4, at 168-169 (1974); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1965) (noting that when a plaintiff "enters
voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve the
risk.... the defendant is relieved of his duty to the plaintiff'); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451 (5th ed. 1984).
50. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986) ("Thus, it has become
necessary, and quite proper, when measuring a defendant's duty to a plaintiff to consider
the risks assumed by the plaintiff.").
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apply assumption of risk when there was no evidence that the defen-
dant's activity was unreasonable in the first place.5 1
For example, in the classic textbook case Murphy v. Steeplechase
Amusement Co., 52 the plaintiff fractured his kneecap while riding "The
Flopper," a fast-moving belt at an amusement park.53 The New York
Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Cardozo, dismissed his
claim under the doctrine of assumption of risk. Judge Cardozo rea-
soned that the plaintiff knew that The Flopper caused people to lose
their balance because he had watched other riders fall. 54 Thus, Judge
Cardozo concluded, because the plaintiff voluntarily chose to encoun-
ter a known danger, he could not recover damages. 55 In a famous
passage, Judge Cardozo remarks:
Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts
the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and neces-
sary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his antagonist or
a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball. The
antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric. The
rough and boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its
own guffaws, but they are not the pleasures of tranquility .... The
timorous may stay at home.
56
This analysis has no relation to whether the plaintiff voluntarily
chose to encounter a known danger. Instead, it suggests that defend-
ants should not be required to eliminate an activity's inherent risks.
Such a determination-that defendants have no legal obligation to
prevent certain injuries-bears the hallmark of pure duty analysis. In
addition, later in the opinion, Judge Cardozo notes that although a
quarter of a million guests rode The Flopper each year, very few were
injured. 57 This reasoning suggests a third basis for exonerating the
defendant from liability: because the benefits of The Flopper out-
weighed its risks, it was perfectly reasonable.
51. See, e.g., Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, supra note 31, at 836-38 (arguing that many
sports-related cases are better explained under the reasonableness concept than assump-
tion of risk).
52. 166 N.E. 179 (N.Y. 1929).
53. Id. at 174.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. "Volenti non fit injuria" is a Latin phrase that means "a person cannot be
harmed by that to which he or she consents." BLACK's LAw DIcrIoNARY 657 (Pocket ed.
West 1996).
57. See Murphy, 166 N.E. at 175 ("Some quota of accidents was to be looked for in so




This kind of analytical imprecision became problematic in the
1970s, when most jurisdictions recognized that it was no longer nor-
matively defensible to allow a plaintiffs own negligence to bar recov-
ery completely.58 Thus, forty-six states abolished the contributory
negligence defense and instituted schemes that apportioned damages
according to fault. 59 In light of this change, unless assumption of risk
was eliminated to the extent that it overlapped with contributory neg-
ligence, "the same conduct by a plaintiff w[ould] be an absolute bar if
viewed as assumption of risk but only a partial bar if considered con-
tributory fault. '60 Courts and commentators identified several distinct
variations of what they once considered to be a single doctrine 61 and
argued about which ones should have survived contributory negli-
gence's fall from grace. 6
2
B. The Current State of the Law
In the last decade, a flurry of litigation between sports partici-
pants forced states to grapple with how to resolve cases that formerly
fell under the rubric of assumption of risk.63 A few jurisdictions re-
tained the traditional defense. 64 Conversely, due to the widespread
abolition of contributory negligence, several states eliminated the doc-
58. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231 (Cal. 1975) ("The basic objection to
[contributory negligence]-grounded in the primal concept that in a system in which lia-
bility is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability-remains
irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness.").
59. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 4, at 350 n.5.
60. Rini v. OaklawnJockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 507 (8th Cir. 1988).
61. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977) (calling assumption of
risk "a potpourri of labels, concepts, definitions, thoughts, and doctrines" and noting "dis-
tinctions ... between primary and secondary; and between reasonable and unreasonable
or, as sometimes expressed, strict and qualified") (citations omitted).
62. See generally John L. Diamond, Assumption of Risk After Comparative Negligence: Inte-
grating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 717 (1991) (arguing in favor of
merging secondary assumption of risk with comparative fault); Simons, Full Preference supra
note 4 (advocating a system in which a plaintiffs claim would be barred only if they "fully
preferred" the risky activity); Stephanie M. Wildman & John C. Barker, Time to Abolish
Implied Assumption of a Reasonable Risk in California, 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 647, 679 (1991) (argu-
ing that assumption of risk should be abolished because it is "accounted for already in the
negligence prima facie case and existing comparative fault defense").
63. See, e.g., MARK A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATrvEs 472
(7th ed. 2001).
64. See Nelson v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 277, 281 (Va. 2003) ("We
continue to be of opinion that fairness militates in favor of the traditional standard be-
cause it clearly places the burden of proof upon the party asserting consent and because of
the absolute defense that consent affords."); Vaughn v. Pleasent, 471 S.E.2d 866, 868 (Ga.
1996); ADM P'ship v. Martin, 702 A.2d 730, 734 (Md. 1997); Huffman v. Walker Jones
Equip. Co., 658 So. 2d 871, 873 (Miss. 1995); Pleiss v. Barnes, 619 N.W.2d 825, 830 (Neb.
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trine completely.65 Eventually, however, most states recast assumption
of risk as duty analysis. This sub-part briefly describes the dominant
contemporary approaches.
1. Primary Assumption of Risk
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk is a shorthand way of
saying that a defendant owes no duty to protect plaintiffs from an ac-
tivity's inherent risks. 66 However, defendants do owe a duty not to "in-
crease" or "enlarge" these risks. 67 Because a plaintiff cannot receive
damages if the defendant has not breached a duty, the doctrine con-
tinues to completely bar recovery. The first cases in which courts con-
sidered the viability of assumption of risk after the abolition of
contributory negligence involved athletes suing other athletes. 68 Al-
though courts soon extended the no duty rule to recreational ven-
dors,69 they initially struggled to define its parameters in that
context. 70 Eventually, most courts held that while athletes may not "in-
crease" a sport's inherent risks through intentional or reckless con-
duct, sponsoring business entities only owe participants a duty not to
negligently increase a sport's inherent risks.71 Other states simply hold
2000); Imbruglio v. Portsmouth IGA, Inc., 747 A.2d 1011, 1012 (R.I. 2000); Pettryv. Rapid
City Area Sch. Dist., 630 N.W.2d 705, 708 (S.D. 2001).
65. See Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 454 (10th Cir. 1982) (ap-
plying Kansas law); Brown v. Kreuser, 560 P.2d 105, 108 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Salinas v.
Vierstra, 695 P.2d 369, 374 (Idaho 1985); Coney v.J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 204
(Ill. 1983); Le v. Johnstown Props., 572 So. 2d 1070, 1073-74 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
66. See, e.g., Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959)
("In one sense (sometimes called its 'primary' sense), [assumption of risk] is an alternate
expression for the proposition that defendant was not negligent, i.e., either owed no duty
or did not breach the duty owed.").
67. See, e.g., Schneider v. Erickson, 654 N.W.2d 144, 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
68. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion).
69. See, e.g., Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 69 (Ct. App. 1995)
(extending no duty rule to white-water rafting company).
70. See, e.g., Bjork v. Mason, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49, 55-56 (Ct. App. 2000) (noting the
confusion). The uncertainty stemmed from the breadth and complexity of the transforma-
tion from the subjective version of assumption of risk to the modern approach. For exam-
ple, the leading case of Knight v. Jewett contains three similar but not identical holdings.
Knight first holds that defendants generally owe no duty to protect plaintiffs from a sport's
inherent risks. See Knight, 844 P.2d at 703. Knight then holds that defendants generally owe
a duty not to increase these risks. Id. at 708. Finally, Knight holds that athletes owe other
athletes a duty not to injure intentionally or recklessly. Id. at 710.
71. For example, in Knight, the California high court illustrated the duty owed by
commercial recreational vendors through an example:
Although a ski resort has no duty to remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does
have a duty to use due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so
as not to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm. The cases establish that th[is]
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vendors to that duty standard without using the phrase "assumption of
risk."'72 Without noticing, courts have offered several slightly different
rationales for the no duty rule.
73
a. The No Duty Rule as Acknowledgement of Reasonableness
First, courts sometimes reason that the no duty rule stems from
the fact that sports are inherently reasonable. 74 This view recognizes
type of risk, posed by a ski resort's negligence, clearly is not a risk (inherent in the
sport) that is assumed by a participant.
Knight, 844 P.2d at 708 (emphasis added); see also Harrold v. RollingJ Ranch, 23 Cal. Rptr.
2d 671, 675-76 (Ct. App. 1993) ( "The general principle which may be extracted from this
discussion in Jewett is that commercial operators of sports and recreational facilities owe a
duty of care to their patrons."); Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr. Inc., 777 A.2d
380, 385 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that "the operator of a sports facility is
subject to a standard of care based on negligence rather than the recklessness standard ap-
plicable to participants in recreational activities"); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 971
(N.Y. 1986) (holding that the conduct of a race track owner "in maintaining the premises
was measured by a general negligence standard").
72. See Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. 1994); Ritchie-Gamester v. City of
Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517, 523-24 (Mich. 1999); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Mass.
1989); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699, 703-04 (Ohio 1990).
On the other hand, some jurisdictions hold both sports participants and recreation
vendors to a duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances. See Auckenthaler v.
Grundmeyer, 877 P.2d 1039, 1044 (Nev. 1994) ("When properly applied, the negligence
standard strikes the proper balance between vigorous participation in sports and accom-
modating litigants injured by unreasonable behavior."); Estes v. Tripson, 932 P.2d 1364,
1366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d 1274,
1284 (N.H. 2002); Lestina v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1993). How-
ever, while breach of duty is traditionally a jury question, appellate courts in these states
sometimes make factual determinations that defendants who have hurt plaintiffs through
conduct that naturally occurs in a sport have not behaved unreasonably. For example, in
Estes, a catcher in a company softball game sued a base-runner who stepped on her leg
while trying to score. See Estes, 932 P.2d at 1365. Although the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant had ample opportunity to avoid the accident, an Arizona appellate court
granted summaryjudgment for the defendant, reasoning that "[n] ot every foreseeable risk
is an unreasonable risk." Id. at 1366 (quoting Rogers v. Retrum, 825 P.2d 20, 23 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991); see also Allen, 807 A.2d at 1284 ("In ordinary negligence terms, a participant,
sponsor or organizer 'who creates only risks that are normal or ordinary to the sport acts as
a reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the circumstances.'") (quoting Crawn v.
Campo, 630 A.2d 368, 373 (N.J. 1993), affd as modified, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994)).
73. From here on, the term "the no duty rule," is used to mean both primary assump-
tion of risk and the approach that holds defendants to no duty to protect plaintiffs from a
sport's inherent risks. See supra text accompanying note 72. These two doctrines are func-
tionally identical, with the minor exception of the uncertainty about whether primary as-
sumption of risk is part of the plaintiff's prima facie case or an affirmative defense. See
supra text accompanying note 33.
74. See, e.g., Crawn, 643 A.2d at 604 (adopting the no duty rule because "[o]ne might
well conclude that something is terribly wrong with a society in which the most commonly-
accepted aspects of play-a traditional source of a community's conviviality and cohe-
sion-spurs litigation").
Summer 2004) EXTREME SPORTS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
that recreational activities are an important part of life for many peo-
ple. Indeed, the collective value of athletic participation, while impos-
sible to quantify, is substantial. Many psychologists believe that team
sports help socialize young people by immersing them in a competi-
tive environment where they must cooperate to succeed. 75 Even soli-
tary recreational activities like skiing "provide opportunities for self-
monitoring, goal-setting, problem solving, and self-reward. '76 Accord-
ing to this approach, even the benefits of an activity like football,
which occasionally kills participants, 77 outweigh its risks.78 Because
football involves exercise, instills discipline, and occupies a place in
our cultural heritage, such a determination, while not uncontrover-
sial,79 is defensible.
b. The No Duty Rule as Subsidy
Another view of the no duty rule goes farther. It claims that the
no duty rule is "a policy judgment that tort law should not impose a
duty where the duty would either chill participation in the activity or
fundamentally alter its nature." 80 This view's central insight is that a
sport's benefits and risks are often intertwined. For example, skiing is
worthwhile partially because it involves traveling at high speeds and
negotiating moguls. A resort could make skiing safer by eliminating
moguls; however, this would also reduce the sport's social value. Thus,
the no duty rule frees a resort from a legal obligation to do so.81 To
the extent that this version of the no duty rule immunizes conduct
that might not otherwise be reasonable from liability, it bestows a sub-
75. See, e.g., Robin Gerber, Team Sports Create Leaders, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2003, at
A13, 2003 WL 5305935.
76. Lynda B. Ransdell, Darcie Oakland & Alison Taylor, Increasing Physical Activity in
Girls and Women: Lessons Learned from the DAMET Project, 74J. PHYsICAL EDuc. 37, 41 (2003).
77. Football causes 20.7 serious injuries per 1,000 participants. See U.S. CONSUMER
PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY REVIEW (Spring 2003), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/cpsr-nws28.pdf (last accessed Jan. 7, 2004).
78. See, e.g., Segoviano v. Housing Authority, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 588 (Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that the sport of flag football is reasonable because it is "a healthy, socially desira-
ble organized recreational activity"), overruled on other grounds by Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d
696, 708 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion).
79. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Expe-
rience with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455, 485 (1999) (criticizing the no duty rule in
the sports setting).
80. Randall v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1253 (E.D. Cal.
1999).
81. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
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sidy upon participants and vendors.8 2 Despite this key difference,
courts often conflate the subsidy and the reasonableness rationales.8 3
c. The No Duty Rule as "Implied Consent"
Several states follow an "implied consent" approach to the no
duty rule. This version of the doctrine applies when the plaintiff en-
gages in conduct that manifests a tacit agreement to face dangers cre-
ated by the defendant, "but does not possess 'the additional
ceremonial and evidentiary weight of an express agreement." 84 In
these courts' eyes, the plaintiffs implied consent to face a specific risk
relieves the defendant from a duty to protect him against it.85 How-
ever, courts employing the consensual approach frequently reach the
same results as courts applying the pure duty approach because they
generally conclude that plaintiffs did not consent to face dangers cre-
ated by a defendant's negligence.8 6
2. Secondary Assumption of Risk
Secondary assumption of risk comes into play when the defen-
dant has breached the duty of care. 87 In duty-based jurisdictions, sec-
82. For example, in Distefano v. Forester, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Ct. App. 2001), a Cali-
fornia appellate court applied primary assumption of risk to the sport of off-roading. The
court did so despite the fact that "the very nature of the sport of off-roading is 'driving
activity that would not be countenanced on streets and highways, such as [ I unsafe speeds,
stirring up dust, [and] becoming airborne on hills,'" thereby creating " ' an inherent risk of
injury, serious injury or even death.'" Id. at 1262. This does not seem like a description of a
reasonable activity; yet the court held that the no duty rule barred the plaintiffs recovery.
Id. at 823-824.
83. See Stimson v. Carlson, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1992) (calling a sport a
"normal ... socially desirable activity that improves the mental and physical well-being of
its participants" but also noting that "[b]y eliminating liability for unintended accidents,
the [primary assumption of risk] doctrine ensures that the fervor of athletic competition
will not be chilled by the constant threat of litigation").
84. Sheppard by Wilson v. Midway R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 288 (Wash. 1987)); see also Rini v.
Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 510 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Arkansas law); Kuehner
v. Green, 436 So. 2d 78, 80 (Fla. 1983); Gyuriak v. Millice 775 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002); Schneider v. Erickson, 654 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) ("For pri-
mary assumption of the risk to apply as a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery, the
evidence must show that the plaintiff manifested consent, express or implied, to relieve the
defendant of his duty of care."); Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1997).
85. See Gyuriak, 775 N.E.2d at 394 ("[P]rimary assumption of risk occurs when an
individual, by voluntarily engaging in an activity, consents to those risks that are inherent
in and arise by virtue of the nature of the activity itself.").
86. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 14 (Wash. 1992) (holding that
the plaintiff did not agree to relieve the defendant from liability for negligence).
87. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707-08 (Cal. 1992) (plurality decision).
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ondary assumption of risk applies if a plaintiffs injury stems from
some negligent action by the defendant that increases a sport's inher-
ent dangers.88 In states that follow the implied consent approach, the
doctrine is triggered by circumstances that indicate that the plaintiff
did not tacitly agree to face the risk that injured him.8 9 Despite its
specialized name, secondary assumption of risk is comparative fault.90
Thus, the jury allocates damages between the parties according to
their respective culpabilities. 9t
3. Express Assumption of Risk
The term "express assumption" of risk refers to a private agree-
ment between parties that alters their rights and obligations under
tort law. 92 Because contract law governs such arrangements, 93 the
elimination of contributory negligence did not affect the doctrine of
express assumption of risk.94 In theory, these waivers should offer
greater protection than primary assumption of risk. Although primary
assumption of risk shields vendors from damages caused by a sport's
inherent risks, it still requires them to exercise reasonable care. A con-
tractual release, on the other hand, can even insulate defendants from
liability stemming from their own negligence.95 Courts usually find
88. See id. at 709.
89. See Scott, 845 P.2d at 14.
90. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.
91. Id.
92. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446 (Cal. 1963) (defining
express assumption of risk as a "private, voluntary transaction [ ] in which one party, for a
consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon
the other party").
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 (2003) (following second Restatement's rule);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2) (1981).
94. See, e.g., Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1106 (N.M. 2003) ("Abo-
lition of contributory negligence does not counsel in favor of abolishing the right of pri-
vate parties to enter into agreements allocating the risks of injury.").
95. See Cain v. Cleveland Parachute Training Ctr., 457 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ohio 1983)
(noting that "[glenerally, specific agreements absolving participants and proprietors from
negligence liability during hazardous recreational activities are enforceable, subject to will-
ful misconduct limitations"); Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (Ct. App.
1993); Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Ctr., 214 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200-201 (Ct. App. 1985) (up-
holding waiver barring negligence claim against skydiving operation); Jones v. Dressel, 623
P.2d 370, 377 (Colo. 1981); Poskozim v. Monnacep, 475 N.E.2d 1042, 1043 (Il1. App. Ct.
1985); Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485, 491 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Malecha v. St. Croix
Valley Skydiving Club, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 727, 729-31 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Schutkowski v.
Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1059-60 (Wyo. 1986); Manning v. Brannon, 956 P.2d 156, 159
(Okla. Civ. App. 1997).
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such waivers valid if they clearly convey the defendant's intention to
disclaim liability for negligence 96 and do not violate public policy.97
But waivers are no panacea for commercial recreation vendors.98
For one, they "are construed strictly against the drafter."99 After the
Vermont Supreme Court recently found that a ski resort could not
contract away its duty of reasonable care, courts have become increas-
ingly demanding about enforcing liability releases in the recreational
context.100 Also, children under the age of eighteen can void other-
96. Some states require waivers to use the term "negligence." See Moore v. Hartley
Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 633 (Alaska 2001).
97. See Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-46 (putting forth a six-factor test for the validity of
liability waivers).
98. Commercial recreational vendors typically require their patrons to sign liability
waivers. See Bresnahan, supra note 16, at D6 (noting that ESPN makes all X-Games partici-
pants sign liability waivers); Lisa O'Donnell, Over the Edge: BASE Jumpers Take Their Yearly
Plunge into the Void Off Bridge Over New River, WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Oct. 27, 2003, at 1,
2003 WL 62349037 (noting that Vertical Visions, a company that organizes BASE jumping
events, requires its patrons to sign liability waivers).
99. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1107 (N.M. 2003); see also Saenz v.
Whitewater Voyages, Inc., 276 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[Dlrafting a legally
valid release is no easy task. Courts have criticized and struck down releases if the language
is oversimplified, if a key word is noted in the title but not the text, and if the release is too
lengthy or too general, to name a few deficiencies."); Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306, 311
(N.Y. 1979) (invalidating skydiving company's waiver where the defendant "seems to have
preferred the use of opaque terminology rather than suffer the possibility of lower enroll-
ment"); Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289, 294-95 (D. Colo. 1993) (invalidat-
ing liability release because that did not list specific risks being assumed); Eder v. Lake
Geneva Raceway, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (same result); Yauger v.
Skiing Enters., 557 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Wis. 1996) (invalidating waiver promulgated by ski re-
sort); Robert Heidt, The Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-Protection: When Exculpatory
Clauses Should Be Enforced, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 381, 390-91 (2003) ("Almost every jurisdic-
tion contains cases where courts have voided or circumvented the release and have allowed
injured patrons who merely show the vendor's negligence to prevail.").
100. See Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 799 (Vt. 1995) ("If defendants were permit-
ted to obtain broad waivers of their liability, an important incentive for ski areas to manage
risk would be removed with the public bearing the cost of the resulting injuries."); Spencer
v. Killington, 702 A.2d 35, 37 (Vt. 1997) (extending Dalury to informal "Ski-Bum" race);
Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265, 271-72 (Ct. App. 2001) (reversing trial
court's grant of summary judgment where skier signed release that was only valid on week-
days, but was injured on a Saturday); Umali v. Mount Snow, Ltd., 247 F. Supp. 2d 567,
572-75 (D. Vt. 2003) (invalidating mountain bike race organizer's waiver under Dalury);
Berlangieri, 76 P.3d at 1003 (commenting that "we cannot deny the truth of [Dalury's] state-
ment that recreational business operators, not their patrons, 'have the expertise and op-
portunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard against the negligence of their
agents and employees"') (quoting Dalury, 670 A.2d at 799); Hyson v. White Water Moun-
tain Resorts, 829 A.2d 827, 829 (Conn. 2003) (holding that waiver which did not mention
term "negligence" could not absolve defendant from its carelessness but reserving the issue
of whether "a well drafted agreement purporting to have such an effect would be enforcea-
ble"); Mauldin v. Coupe, No. C041511, at 7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2003), available atWL
22430206 (concluding that motocross track operator's release was too broad and mislead-
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wise binding agreements by taking action to disaffirm the contract. 1° 1
Filing a lawsuit for personal injuries suffices to void a waiver for per-
sons under the age of majority. 10 2 In addition, it is well-settled that
parents may not consent on behalf of their children to release a de-
fendant from liability.10 3 Thus, in the extreme sports context, where
many participants are minors, 10 4 express assumption of risk provides
vendors with limited protection at best.10 5 Moreover, as discussed be-
low, many state legislatures have inadvertently eliminated a vendor's
ing to be enforced). Indeed, despite widespread use of waivers, recent decades have born
witness to "a sharp curtailment of the availability of some recreational activities." Heidt,
supra note 99, at 381. For example, liability concerns have caused many recreational swim-
ming pools to take down their high dives. See Susan Levine, Fall of the High Dive, WASH.
POST, July 13, 2002, at B1.
101. See Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc., 687 So. 2d 353, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(invalidating waiver signed by fourteen-year-old girl who was hurt while horseback riding);
Smoky, Inc. v. McCray, 396 S.E.2d 794, 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (invalidating horseback
riding waivers); Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1960)
(applying Massachusetts law and holding even minor who misrepresented age may void
contract); Celli v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 904, 909 (Ct. App. 1979)
(invalidating release signed by nine-year-old injured at auto race); Cunningham v. State, 32
N.Y.S.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1942) (minor not bound by waiver executed before bobsled-
ding injury). Some jurisdictions extend this principal to derivative actions brought by par-
ents to recover for a child's injuries. See, e.g., Kotary v. Spencer Speedway, Inc., 365
N.Y.S.2d 87, 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
102. See Dilallo, 687 So. 2d at 357. But seeJones v. Dressel, 582 P.2d 1057 (Colo. Ct. App.
1978). In Jones, the plaintiff signed a release absolving a skydiving center from all liability
when he was seventeen. Id. at 1058. However, he then attempted to skydive again after
turning eighteen and was injured when the plane from which he was to parachute crashed.
Id. The court held that the plaintiff had ratified the agreement by attempting to jump
again after he had reached the age of majority. Id.
103. See Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 805 (Ct. App.
1998) (upholding release signed by parent for child's participation on school cheerleading
team); Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1234 (Colo. 2002), overruled by CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 13-22-107 (West 2003); Fedor v. Boy Scouts of America, 143 A.2d 466, 468
(Conn. Super. 1958); Meyer v. Naperville Manor, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994); Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979); Fitzgerald v. Newark
Morning Ledger Co., 267 A.2d 557, 559 (NJ. 1970); Childress v. Madison County, 777
S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Munoz v. IIJaz, Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1993); Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Utah 2001); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain
Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 12 (Wash. 1992). But see Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d
201, 205-06 (Ohio 1998) (upholding parent's signature on release for child in context of
non-profit groups); Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 747 (Mass. 2002) (same
result); Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activities-The Alter-
native to "Nerf Tiddlywinks,"53 OHIo ST. L.J. 683 (1992) (arguing that such waivers should
be valid).
104. For example, eighty-five percent of all skateboarders are under the age of eigh-
teen. See Go Figure, CHI. T~iB., July 27, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 60112031.
105. In addition, there is a plausible argument that while contractual loss-shifting may
be appropriate where a participant takes his chances with bumps and bruises, a defendant
"should not be permitted to exculpate himself from responsibility ... where any negli-
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ability to contractually disclaim liability for negligence by passing
sport-specific statutes that preempt this common law prerogative.
4. Inherent Risk Statutes
Because the doctrine of assumption of risk has been in such flux,
many states have attempted to protect vendors by enacting legislation
that frees them from liability for injuries caused by a sport's inherent
risks.106 These statutes cover a broad range of activities, including
horseback-riding, 10 7 skiing,108 roller-skating,10 9 and snowmobiling. 110
Few inherent risk statutes directly address extreme sports."1
However, courts interpret these statutes broadly, occasionally ex-
tending them to encompass non-traditional activities that bear a re-
semblance to the particular sport that is the target of the
legislation. 112 In addition, five jurisdictions have passed statutes that
apply to all recreational activities."t 3 Legislation in California, North
Carolina, and Illinois also exempts governmental entities from claims
brought by "any person who participates in a hazardous recreational
activity." 114
Ironically, rather than reinforcing business entities' safeguards
against liability for sponsoring extreme sports, these statutes often de-
gence would create a strong potential of immediate and violent death." Manning v. Bran-
non, 956 P.2d 156, 161 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997) (Hansen, J., dissenting).
106. For a detailed survey of these statutes, see John 0. Spengler & Brian P. Burket,
Sport Safety Statutes and Inherent Risk: A Comparison Study of Sport Specific Legislation, 11 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORTS 135 (2001).
107. Over forty states have enacted statutes insulating equestrian center operators from
the inherent risks of horseback riding. Id. at 161.
108. Twenty-two jurisdictions have passed laws limiting ski resort owners' liabilities. Id.
109. Id. at 162-63.
110. Id. at 163.
111. One exception is Maine, which has a hang gliding-specific inherent risk statute.
See 32 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15219 (West 2002) ("[A] person who is hang gliding is
deemed to have assumed the risk and legal responsibility for any injury to the hang glider's
person or property in the same manner and to the same extent as skiers under this chap-
ter."); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-52 (2002) (statute covers snowboarders).
112. For instance, in Shukowski v. Indian Head Mountain Resort, 166 F.3d 848, 851 (6th
Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals barred the claim of a snowboarder under the
Michigan Skier Act. Courts might also extend statutes that cover roller skating rinks to
skate parks. Id.
113. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.290 (Michie 2002); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 663B-1
(Michie 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1038 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (2003);
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-122 (Michie 2001).
114. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 831.7 (West 2002); see also 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/3-109
(West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-E-24 (2003). These statutes are significant because of
the growing number of skate-parks that are owned and operated by municipalities. See
supra text accompanying note 29.
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prive them of a formidable means of protection. Recall that express
assumption of risk generally permits defendants to contract away their
duty of due care unless doing so would contravene public policy.
Many statutes immunize companies from suits arising from a sport's
inherent risks, yet permit suits in which the plaintiff alleges that a ven-
dor's negligence caused the harm.1 15 These exemptions evince clear
legislative recognition of the fact that precluding negligence claims
adversely impacts public safety. Therefore, courts regularly invalidate
releases that claim to relieve vendors from negligence liability if a
sport-specific inherent risk statute applies to the activity in ques-
tion.116 Most recently, in Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp.,1 1 7 the New
Mexico Supreme Court nullified a waiver that attempted to shield a
horseback-riding company from damages for unreasonable con-
duct. ' 8 The court reasoned that the state's Equine Liability Act,
which expressly permits negligence claims, "expresses in general
115. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.290 (Michie 2002) (covering all "sports or recrea-
tional activities" but exempting a "civil action based on the negligence of the provider");
COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-44-103 (2001) (ski statute permits suits for negligence); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-1103(10) (Michie 2002) (ski statute permits suits for negligence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 508:19 (2001) (equine statute permits suits for negligence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:13:3
(West 1994) (ski statute permits suits for negligence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:13:4 (West 1994)
(roller skating statute permits suits for negligence); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 18-101 (McKinney
1997) (ski statute permits suits for "unreasonable" risks); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-E-2 (1998)
(equine statute permits suits for negligence); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-E-11 (1998) (roller skat-
ing statute permits suits for negligence); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 87.003
(Vernon 1997) (enumerating viable causes of action against equine activity sponsors);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27(b)-102 (2002) (equine statute permits suits for negligence);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74A.45.030(4) (West 1998) (ski statute permits suits for negli-
gence); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-3A-6 (Michie 2002) (ski statute permits suits for negli-
gence); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-123 (Michie 2001) (applying to "any sport or recreational
opportunity" and permitting suits for negligence); Ammie I. Roseman-Orr, Comment, Rec-
reational Activity Liability in Hawai'i: Are Waivers Worth the Paper on Which They Are Written?, 21
U. HAw. L. REV. 715, 717 & n.11 (1999). Hawaii's statute precludes the use of summary
judgment and "allows liability for inherent risks (other than negligence) to be released
only with a proper waiver, upon full disclosure, and if reasonable care is given." Id. (citing
HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-1.54(b)-(c) (1990)).
116. See Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 668 P.2d 982, 987 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)
("[S]tatutory provisions may not be modified by private agreement if doing so would vio-
late the public policy expressed in the statute."); Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd.
839 F. Supp. 789, 796 (D. Utah 1993) ("Legitimate claims of negligence against ski resorts
are not prohibited by the Skiing Act"); Derricotte v. United Skates of Am., 794 A.2d 867,
871 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that the NewJersey Roller Skating Act "does
not immunize a rink operator from liability for negligently instructing a person how to
roller skate"); Steele v. Mt. Hood Meadows, Ltd., 974 P.2d 794, 798-99 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(interpreting waiver of "any claims for personal injury" not to include negligence because
of statutory scheme).
117. 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003).
118. Id. at I111.
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terms a public policy of our Legislature that equine operators should
be accountable for injuries due to their own fault."1 19
Similarly, a Maine statute was intended to limit the legal responsi-
bility of hang gliding operations.120 Maine courts have consistently up-
held broad liability waivers. 121 Nevertheless, although the Maine
legislation immunizes companies from tort claims arising from hang
gliding's inherent risks, it also authorizes suits for "negligent facility
design and operation."1 22 A Maine court would therefore likely strike
down any release that purported to insure a hang gliding outfit from
the consequences of unreasonable conduct as violating the statute's
expression of public policy.
Thus, sport-specific inherent risk statutes further erode the pro-
tection that express assumption of risk offers. This incongruity under-
scores the need for a sound and reliable primary assumption of risk
doctrine. As this Article discusses next, however, its current incarna-
tions are inadequate when applied to high risk recreational activities.
II. Problems Applying Modern Assumption of Risk Doctrine
to Extreme Sports
A. Classifying Extreme Sports Under a Negligence Regime
The doctrine of negligence was originally understood as a broad-
based normative generalization.123 An actor's conduct was measured
against the reasonably prudent person: "a creature of the law's imagi-
nation" who "in foresight, caution, courage, judgment, self-control,
[and] altruism... represents.., the general average of the commu-
nity."1 24 Jury instructions still utilize this objective standard. 125 How-
ever, with the ascent of law and economics, reasonableness has taken a
subtly different form. As the Restatement (Third) of Torts elucidates,
scholars and appellate judges now often view negligence as hinging
119. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-13-4 (Michie Supp. 2003)).
120. See 32 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15219 (West 2002).
121. See Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248, 252 (Me. 1966); Butters v. Kane, 347 A.2d
602, 607 (Me. 1975); Cyr v. Cyr, 560 A.2d 1083, 1084 (Me. 1989).
122. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 at § 15219.
123. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. Riv. 813, 824-25 (2001).
124. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 63, at 50-51 (quoting 3 F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW
OF TORTS 389-90 (2d ed. 1986)).
125. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 425, 427 (2002) ("[S]tate pattern jury instructions.., define negligence
as a failure to exercise the 'ordinary care' or 'reasonable care' that would be exercised by
the 'reasonably prudent' or 'reasonably careful' or 'ordinary prudent' person.").
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on whether a party could have prevented an accident by taking a cost-
effective precaution. 126 This test, as famously articulated by Judge
Learned Hand, states that negligence occurs when the probability of
injury multiplied by the gravity of damages exceeds the price of safety
measures which would have avoided the harm. 127
To illustrate the difficulty of applying the basic tort standard to
extreme sports, consider Bridge Day, an annual BASE jumping
event.128 Each October, a company called Vertical Visions gives par-
ticipants the opportunity to parachute off of the 837-foot-high New
River Gorge Bridge in Fayetteville, West Virginia. 129 BASE jumping,
which also involves leaping from cliffs, dams, and skyscrapers, is one
of the riskiest activities imaginable. 30 Because less than ten seconds
elapse between the jump and landing, there is little opportunity to
maneuver and no chance to deploy a reserve parachute.13 1 In fact, two
weeks before last year's Bridge Day, Dwain Weston-considered the
world's best BASE jumper-was killed during a similar event. 132 In
2003, ninety of Bridge Day's four hundred participants had never
BASE jumped before.' 3 3 By the end of the event, four were hospital-
ized with broken bones.13 4
Under a wholly objective conception of negligence, it is probably
not reasonable to BASE jump. Although the extreme sports move-
ment constitutes a sea change in the public perception of risk-taking,
it is unlikely that twelve jurors would deem BASE jumping socially ac-
ceptable. The same is probably true for many extreme sports:
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 4 (Discussion Draft
Apr. 5, 1999).
127. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (stating
the famous "Hand Formula" for negligence: "if the probability [of injury] be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden [of precautions] B; liability depends upon whether B is less than
L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL"). AsJudge Posner argued ten years later, the Hand
Formula "adumbrat[ed], perhaps unwittingly, an economic theory of negligence." Richard
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
128. BASE is an acronym for building, antenna, span, and earth. The name was in-
vented by Carl and Jean Boenish, who were later both killed while participating in the
sport. See Mark Sommer, New Breed of Parachutist Dances on Disaster's Edge, BUFFALO NEWS,
June 8, 2003, at Al, 2003 WL 6450622.
129. See O'Donnell, supra note 98.
130. See Sommer, supra note 128.
131. See O'Donnell, supra note 98.
132. See Scott Willoughby, BASE Jumper Was 'Best in Business': 30 year-old Australian Died
During Stunt After Competition at Royal Gorge Bridge, DENVER POST, Oct. 7, 2003, at Al, 2003
WL 5522798.
133. See O'Donnell, supra note 98.
134. Id.
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motocross, in which a single accident can break a dozen bones, 1'35
BMX, which has sent star performer Mat Hoffman to the operating
table fifteen times,' 36 or any of the "tricked-out" skateboarding events
at Tony Hawk's Boom-Boom Huckjam, where athletes are introduced
by name, hometown, and "worst recent injury." 1 37 But, then again,
none of Bridge Day's participants could have BASE jumped without
Vertical Visions, which organized and publicized the event. 138 Simi-
larly, bungee jumpers require specialized rigs, and motocross, BMX,
and skateboarding all take place in custom-built tracks or parks. If it is
unreasonable to BASE jump from the New River Gorge Bridge, then
surely it must be unreasonable for Vertical Visions to offer the oppor-
tunity to do so.
The cost-benefit definition of negligence complicates matters. Al-
though the aggregate expense of BASE jumping injuries may exceed
the sport's social value, the same cost-benefit determination does not
apply to each individual participant.' 3 9 To the contrary, "the judg-
ment that a plaintiff is . . .negligent depends only on the plaintiffs
own internal calculus."' 40 Measured by this utilitarian yardstick, BASE
jumping is entirely reasonable for a select few. At Bridge Day, most
participants released their parachutes immediately after leaping from
the bridge.14 1 Several waited as long as six seconds-a mere 2.3
seconds before they hit the ground. 142 These people, known as "risk-
135. For example, motocross competitor Cary Hart once broke fourteen bones in a
single accident. See The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, July 17, 2003), 2003 WL
55605537.
136. Hoffman has broken over fifty bones. See Jose Antonio Vargas, The Agony of the
Ecstasy: Extreme Athletes Don't Let Danger, or Injury, Diminish Their Love of the Games, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 21, 2001, at 3, 2001 WL 27183970. Chad Kagy, who also rides BMX, has
suffered through six knee operations. See Shannon Russell, Equipment Decreases Extreme-
Sports Risks, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 22, 2003, at B1, 2003 WL 55042909.
137. Reilly Capps, Tony Hawk Ramps Up the Excitement, WAsH. POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at Cl,
2003 WL 62228247.
138. See VERTICAL VISIONS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2002), at http://
www.vertical-visions.com/28faq.html#6 (last accessed July 11, 2004); see also O'Donnell,
supra note 98, at 3 (Each participant paid seventy dollars for the chance to jump. Vertical
Visions requires patrons to have sky diving experience, but has no way to verify this
information.).
139. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CAR-
DOZO L. REv. 1693, 1719 (1995) [hereinafter Simons, Puzzling Doctrine] (arguing that "utili-
tarianism can certainly accommodate highly varied individual judgments of the good");
Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697,
715-16 (1978) ("Economics is keen on leaving to each individual the right to define and
determine his goal.") [hereinafter Schwartz, Reappraisal].
140. Simons, Puzzling Doctrine, supra note 139, at 1720.
141. See O'Donnell, supra note 98, at 2.
142. Id.
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preferrers," turn the negligence equation on its head. Instead of
weighing risks against benefits, risk-preferrers view an activity's danger
as part of its allure.' 43 For risk-perferrers, the riskier BASE jumping
gets, the better. 144 To brand BASE jumping unreasonable for a risk-
preferrer is to substitute a normative judgment for a deeply-felt per-
sonal inclination. Interference with such a fully-informed, autono-
mous decision smacks of paternalism. 145 As will be discussed, this is
especially true when the plaintiff imposes a risk of harm only on
himself.14
6
In addition, BASE jumping may be reasonable for other Bridge
Day participants. Those who have BASE jumped before may conclude
on the basis of their past experience that the activity's thrill is worth
the potential for injury. 14 7 Again, branding the sport unreasonable
with respect to these repeat players allows social norms to override the
results of an individual cost-benefit calculation. However, not every
repeat player makes an informed choice. Some may have jumped
under safer conditions; others may not be aware of how real the odds
of serious injury actually are. The cost-benefit definition of negligence
takes for granted that individuals will make choices that actually fur-
ther their own net good. Indeed, a decision "increases one's welfare
(and indirectly, social welfare) only when it results from one's in-
formed, voluntary choice to engage in the transaction, or when it ac-
curately mimics the choice that one would have made under those
ideal conditions."1 48 Conversely, a decision made on the basis of im-
143. See, e.g., Paula Horvath & Marvin Zuckerman, Sensation Seeking, Risk Appraisal, and
Risky Behavior, 14 PERS. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 41, 41 (1993) ("High sensation seekers
take risks [because they] value the rewards of the activities more than the low sensation
seekers .... The intense reward effects of such activities may outweigh the risks for the
high sensation seekers.").
144. See Rhea Wessel, Executive Health: Risk-Lovers Take Sports to the Extreme, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Jan. 30, 2004, at P3, 2004 WL-WSJE 56862342. In fact, one reason extreme sports may
be reasonable for high sensation seekers is because they are literally less dangerous. In-
deed, "[h]igh sensation seekers may have an orienting reflex ... and during that time,
sensations are intensified and clarified, so they ... actually can function better." Talk Na-
tion (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 22, 2003), 2003 WL 6674600 (statement of Garrett Soden,
author of FALLING: How OUR GREATEST FEAR BECAME OUR GREATEST THRILL (2002)).
145. Schwartz, Reappraisal, supra note 139, at 715-16 ("When a plaintiff has idiosyn-
cratic values, it is hardly clear that his is conduct that society should really want to
prevent.").
146. See infra Part II.A.3.
147. SeeJason Scott Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Rational Actor Approach to the
Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 747, 759
(2003) ("Smoking, overeating, hang gliding, and other risky behaviors are.., such that the
individuals who choose to engage in these behaviors get positive utility from so doing.").
148. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 901 (1994).
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perfect information introduces the potential for error and under-
mines the cost-benefit definition of negligence's utility-maximizing
purpose.
Accordingly, Bridge Day jumpers who never engaged in the sport
before stake an even more tenuous claim to reasonableness. Although
their participation indicates that they have concluded, on some level,
that the activity is worth doing, society may not want to credit such a
choice if it does not stem from a rational deliberative process. Risk-
averse extreme sports participants inflict a net loss on society: unlike
risk-preferrers or repeat players, such individuals have no utility gain
to offset the cost of their accidents.
Therefore, it is impossible to generalize about high risk sports
without grossly oversimplifying. The traditional assumption of risk de-
fense, which barred recovery whether the plaintiffs conduct was rea-
sonable or unreasonable, obviated this problem. As explained in the
subsections below, the modern approach presses it to the fore.
1. The No Duty Rule's Imprimatur of Reasonableness
As mentioned, some courts believe that the no duty rule stems
from the fact that sports are inherently reasonable. 149 Others believe
that the no duty rule represents a judgment that courts should not
impose a legal obligation that would change the way sports are
played. ' 50 Because "[a] no-duty or limited-duty rule withholds scrutiny
of reasonableness," 151 both the reasonableness and subsidy ap-
proaches have the same effect-to brand a broad range of risky activi-
ties reasonable as a matter of law.
As argued above, extreme sports are not reasonable when offered
indiscriminately to the public. For example, compare motorcycling,
one of the riskiest socially-sanctioned activities, to the sport of
motocross. Motorcycle riders are nearly twenty times more likely to
die in accidents than car passengers. 152 Yet despite the fact that there
are three times more motorcycles than motocross bikes, last year both
activities seriously injured the same number of people.1 53 Thus, there
is a plausible argument that society should not allow motocross at all.
149. See supra Part I.B.l.a.
150. See supra Part l.B.l.b.
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. d (2003).
152. See Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Traffic Safety Facts 2000: Motorcycles
(2000), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2000/
2000mcyfacts.pdf (last accessed Jan. 7, 2004).
153. See Motor Sport, supra note 2.
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But the absurdity of the no duty rule comes into sharp relief when one
recalls that not only does it beg the question of whether to permit
motocross, but whether motocross is reasonable. Precluding a court
from considering whether the benefits of motocross outweigh its risks
for seasoned X Game competitor Mike Metzger-who has so many
screws and surgical plates in his body that he is unable to pass through
airport metal detectors154-makes sense. On the other hand, the same
rule applied to five-year-old Tyler Santos, killed on his motocross bike
in July 2003, does not. 155
In addition, even the subsidy rationale for the no duty rule must
yield to society's interest in preventing injuries at some point. Al-
though motorcycling is extraordinarily dangerous, courts let it con-
tinue. As Gregory Keating explains,
The substantial risks of riding motorcycles are acceptable because:
(1) those risks are inseparable from the activity; (2) the activity re-
alizes values which we can imagine figuring in a plausible and de-
fensible human life; and (3) the special, substantial risks of
motorcycling are largely borne by motorcyclists, and voluntarily
SO.156
But some recreational activities do not fulfill these criteria. For
example, Russian roulette cannot be made safer without having its es-
sential nature destroyed and it too imposes risks only on participants.
Nevertheless, because the act of pointing a loaded gun to one's head
and pulling the trigger does not further values that society is willing to
legitimate, it is illegal. 15 7 Similarly, Vertical Visions obtained a special
permit for Bridge Day because BASE jumping at any other time is
.against the law.1 58 Paradoxically, the subsidy rationale for the no duty
rule dictates that BASE jumping-though a criminal act-possesses
154. See George Dickie, flying High: Sky's the Limit in this Competition, CHI. TRI., Aug. 17,
2003, at 3, 2003 WL 62150268.
155. See Timothy Pratt, Track's Future Unclear After Child's Death, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 2,
2003, 2003 WL 7822292.
156. Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 653, 715 (2003). Accordingly, many states regulate motorcycling. See, e.g., People v.
Elkins, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 507 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1992) (upholding a
mandatory helmet law as reasonable under the police power).
157. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223, 224-25 (Mass. 1963) (hold-
ing that participation in Russian roulette made defendant liable for involuntary
manslaughter).
158. See Willoughby, supra note 132; O'Donnell, supra note 98; see also United States v.
Oxx, 127 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 1997) (interpreting statute to prohibit BASE jumping
in national parks) (citing 36 C.F.R. § 2.17(a) (3) (1996)); United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d
670, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing same statute).
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an innate value so far in excess of its social cost that a court cannot
even consider whether its benefits outweigh its risks.
Indeed, courts have recognized that the no duty rule does not
apply to all recreational activities. For example, in Record v. Reason,
159
a California appellate court noted that it only applies to "sports."1 60
The court reasoned that a "sport" is as an activity that is "done for
enjoyment or thrill, requires physical exertion as well as elements of
skill, and involves a challenge containing a potential risk of injury."161
Subsequently, in Shannon v. Rhodes,'62 another California appellate
court held that simply riding in a waterskiing boat was not a "sport."163
The court noted that the point of being a passenger in a boat is to
move from place to place. 164 Although riding in a boat is risky, the
court explained, it can easily be made safer without concomitantly re-
ducing the activity's effectiveness as a form of transportation.
1 65
However, if the subsidy rationale for the no duty rule does not
apply to being a boat passenger because its benefits exist indepen-
dently of its risks, it should not apply to an activity like BASE jumping
for the opposite reason. Despite the intense kinetic experience of fall-
ing off of tall structures, BASE jumping involves virtually no affirma-
tive conduct. BASE jumpers perform one action-pulling their
ripcords-during the course of an event that spans a mere ten
seconds.1 66 Sky diving, by contrast, lasts about seven minutes and re-
quires maneuvering to stay on course. 167 Record's definition of a
"sport" envisions an activity that involves exercise, challenge, and risk.
Yet BASE jumping offers little more than risk itself People play sports
to stay healthy and hone their skills. People BASE jump to experience
159. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (Ct. App. 1999).
160. Id. at 554.
161. Id.
162. 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217 (Ct. App. 2001).
163. Id. at 223-224.
164. Id. at 224.
165. Id. ("It simply cannot be said that the 'nature' of the activity of recreational boat-
ing will be altered if boat drivers are required to exercise due care .... "). Similarly, in
Childs v. County of Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823, 825 (Ct. App. 2004), a California
appellate court held that riding a scooter was not a "sport" where there was no evidence
that the plaintiff "was riding at any particular speed, or with other children in a structured
on unstructured contest, or was testing the limits of her ability on the scooter, or ... was
attempting any trick or maneuver requiring skill." Id. at 825.
166. See O'Donnell, supra note 98.
167. See Get Out: See Tiy Sky Diving, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at M9, 2003
WL 56511577.
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being "as close as you can get to cheating death."'1 68 Thus, to extend
the no duty rule to the activity is to subsidize pure risk-taking. 69
In addition, the no duty rule presupposes that certain internal
and external forces limit the degree of potentially injurious conduct
in recreational activities. For one, sports have rules that discourage
risky behavior. 170 The no duty rule itself also establishes an outer
boundary: defendants may not increase a sport's inherent risks.' 7 '
However, these checks on dangerous conduct do not exist in the ex-
treme sports context. Rule-less activities like BASE jumping,
motocross, BMX, hang gliding, sky diving, bungee jumping, and rock
climbing are characterized by their fluid and improvisational nature.
Extreme sports participants compete within a hierarchy where willing-
ness to gamble with physical safety is the coin of the realm. 172 Also,
the phrase "extreme," though overused by the media, 173 generally sig-
nifies something fundamentally at odds with the duty not to increase
inherent risks: that participants have taken "an established sport, and,
by changing its locale, season or equipment" made it more danger-
ous.174 In ice climbing, for example, competitors scale a frozen water-
168. See O'Donnell, supra note 98.
169. BASEjumping is essentially "a leap of faith." Sommer, supra note 128. Others have
compared BASE jumping to Russian roulette. For example,Jari Kuosma, an extreme sports
entrepreneur recently explained that his organization "[o]fficially... do[esn't] even rec-
ommend BASE jumping" because "[wie can't really recommend Russian roulette to any-
body. Although it's fun." Michael Abrams, The Birdman of DeLand, FORBES, May 26, 2003, at
54.
170. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion). Also, in
organized sports, the presence of referees and the possibility of sanctions from league offi-
cials render tort law superfluous, as "there already exists outside the formal legal system, an
elaborate structure to deal with goals of deterrence, punishment, and justice." Sugarman,
Assumption of Risk, supra note 31, at 848. No similar concepts exist in the extreme sports
context.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
172. Indeed, "[s]erious injuries are part of the extreme-sport mystique." Mike
Antonucci, Hawk's Huckjam an Extreme Event, SANJOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 10, 2002, at DI.
173. SeeJustin Kerr, Showshoe-Racing is a Hot Item This Year, PORTLAND OREGONiAN, Jan.
29, 1998, at 6, 1998 WL 4177601 (claiming that the phrase "extreme sports" applies to "any
semi-unorthodox" activity).
174. See Deborah Stokes, Winter Tracks, NAT'L POST, Nov. 29, 2000, at Fl, 2000 WL
29576974. Other extreme sports combine elements of several risky activities. For example,
kite-boarding is a "fusion of surfing, kite-flying and parasailing." Lisa Rose, Going to Ex-
tremes: Kiteboarders and Skateboarders, in Search of Thrills, Test Their Limits, NJ. STAR-LEDGER,
Aug. 15, 2002, at 53. The sport was born "when adrenaline junkies experimented with
water skis propelled by wing-shaped kites." See Beth Kwon, Reach for the Sky, FORTUNE SMALL
BUS., Sept. 1, 2002, at 93, 2002 WL 15146576. Similarly, wake-boarding "is akin to water-
skiing on a snowboard." David Arnold, Up, Up, and Away: Wen Seeking a New Thrill, Go Fly a
Kite, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 2003, at D7, 2003 WL 3413398. SnoCross is "like a motocross
race on snow," featuring 100 foot jumps on snowmobiles. See Cammy Clark, Injuries Won't
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fall. t 75 Superior Climbing, a company that offers the sport, describes it
as "rock climbing turned up a notch or two on the danger scale. 176
Similarly, BASE jumping is "an extreme version of sky diving."' 177 Bun-
gee jumping has evolved into "bungee bouncing."178 Given the prohi-
bition against increasing risks, these activities should be considered
legally reasonable only if a plaintiff makes a fully-informed decision to
engage in them. Yet the no duty rule imposes no such requirement.
Thus, as participants continue to push the envelope and sports take
risky new forms, the no duty rule paints all recreational activities with
the same broad strokes.
2. The Duty Not to Increase Inherent Risks and Doctrinal
Incoherence
Conceptual disorder breeds doctrinal disorder. As noted, spon-
soring business entities owe participants a duty not to negligently in-
crease a sport's inherent risks.179 This section demonstrates how
courts have failed to apply this rule to high risk recreational activities
in a consistent manner. 180
Put Brakes on Snocross Star, MiAMi HERALD, Dec. 21, 2003, at 15, 2003 WL 71419006.
T.J. Gulla, the sport's preeminent competitor has broken his collarbones five times-once
so severely that "splinters came through the skin." See id.
175. See Koerner, supra note 16, at 50.
176. Id. Ice climbing aficionados "expect to lose three to four friends per year" to the
sport. Id.; see also Michael Ko & Sara Jean Green, Avalanche Kills Three Veteran Climbers,
SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at Al, 2004 WL 58924014. BASE jumping has also evolved
into two even riskier sports: "free running" and "urban exploration." In free running, par-
ticipants perform acrobatics-without safety net or cables-on skyscraper ledges and mon-
uments. See Arifa Akbar, The Latest Extreme Sport-Tree Running' Hits Britain, INDEPENDENT
(London), Aug. 14, 2003, at 3, 2003 WL 60756072. Urban exploration involves prowling
condemned city property. See Gregory Kirschling, Social Climbers, ENT. WKLY, July 25,
2003, at 75, 2003 WL 56001469.
177. Karen Rivedal, Jumping Professor Got Tangled in Risky Sport, Wis. ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003,
at 1, 2003 WL 59176482.
178. See Blankenship v. CRT Tree, No. 80907, 2002 WL 31195215, at *1 n.7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 3, 2002) (defining "bungee bouncing" as "a variation of the activity of bungee
jumping"). "Rather than jumping off of a high structure, the 'bouncer' wears a harness
that is attached with a bungee cord to the wire cable of a crane and is hoisted off the
ground. An operator then takes up and lets out the cable to create a bouncing motion for
the participant." Id. (citations omitted),
179. See supra text accompanying note 72.
180. One problem is the comparative novelty of extreme sports. Defining the "inherent
risks" of an extreme sport can be difficult. Indeed, as Staten v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr.
2d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 1996) noted, courts may be forced to make such a determination
"while factually uninformed of how the sport is played and ... whether a given injury is
within the 'inherent' risk of the sport .... We all grew up with baseball and football; some
of us have skated, skied, or sailed. But what of sports such as, say .... parasailing?" Id.
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Some courts have held that extreme sports providers simply owe
no duty to protect patrons from the activity's inherent risks. For exam-
ple, in Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court,181 a student
fell to his death during a rock climbing class. 182 Although there was
evidence that instructors had accidentally positioned four rope
anchors in the same crack system-a violation of rock climbing cus-
tom-a California appellate court noted that "ifialling, whether be-
cause of one's own slip, a co-climber's stumble, or an anchor system
giving way, is the very risk inherent in the sport mountain climbing
and cannot be completely eliminated without destroying the sport it-
self."183 Without considering whether the instructors had "increased"
the sport's inherent risks by misplacing the rope anchors, the court
barred the plaintiffs claim under primary assumption of risk. 184
Yet in Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc.,i8 5 another California ap-
pellate court required more of a BMX track owner. The seventeen-
year-old plaintiff was paralyzed while riding his bike on the defen-
dant's course. He had attempted to perform a wheelie over an obsta-
cle called the "million dollar jump."'81 6 The plaintiff and defense
experts disagreed about whether the million dollar jump was too
steep.'8 7 The court noted that, under the doctrine of primary assump-
tion of risk, the track owner had no legal obligation to eliminate ob-
stacles and jumps that are an inherent part of the sport.188 However,
the court reasoned, the defendant did have a duty not to "create an
extreme risk of injury" with the jump. 8 9 Because the court deter-
mined that the plaintiffs expert's testimony created a disputed issue
of material fact, it reversed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the defendant. 190
For example, in Maudlin v. Coupe, No. C041511, 2003 WL 22430206, at *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct 27, 2003), the plaintiff was struck by an errant motocross bike. The defendant
submitted an affidavit from one of the promoters who claimed to have participated in six
hundred races and viewed thousands, saying that a motorcycle leaving the course was a
common event. Id. at *7. Yet the court held that it could not decide whether the defendant
had increased motocross's inherent risks because it did not have enough information
about the sport. Id. at *8.
181. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Ct. App. 1996).
182. Id. at 923.
183. Id. at 925-26.
184. Id.
185. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (Ct. App. 1995).
186. Id. at 394-95.
187. Id. at 395.




Similarly, in Dare v. Freefall Adventures,1 91 the plaintiff, a veteran
skydiver, was hurt when he tried to avoid colliding with a fellow
skydiver. He sued both his co-participant and the skydiving com-
pany.192 The New Jersey Appellate Division explained that a reckless-
ness standard applied to the co-participant, noting that "it would
hardly promote 'vigorous participation' in the activity if skydivers were
exposed to lawsuits when their mere negligence during descent
caused an injury to a co-participant." 193 However, the court refused to
apply the recklessness standard to the skydiving company. 19 4 Opera-
tors of sports facilities, the court explained, should be held to a duty
not to "materially increase" the odds that the plaintiff would be in-
jured "beyond those reasonably anticipated by skydiving
participants." 195
Conversely, in Lamp v. Reynolds,196 a Michigan appellate court
held a motocross track owner to an even higher standard of care. The
plaintiff executed two liability waivers before participating in a race. 197
After completing a jump, the plaintiff swerved off of the track and
struck a tree stump that was hidden in a patch of weeds. 198 The court
upheld the trial court's determination that the defendant's failure to
remove the stump constituted willful and wanton misconduct. 199 Even
though the stump stood outside the race course, the court reasoned
that the defendant should have foreseen the potential for a serious
accident in light of the fact that motocross riders travel at high speeds
and occasionally lose control of their bikes.20 0 In addition, because
state law forbade defendants from contracting to shield themselves
from damages for willful and wanton misconduct, the court voided
both liability releases. 20 1
Startlingly, these irreconcilable holdings hinge on the same varia-
ble: the hazardous nature of the activity that injured the plaintiff. Re-
gents reasons that the plaintiff's decision to participate in rock
climbing is sufficiently blameworthy to allocate the burden of prevent-
191. 793 A.2d 125 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2002).
192. See id. at 128.
193. Id. at 131.
194. See id. at 132-33.
195. Id. at 133. Because the plaintiff produced no evidence that either defendant had
breached its particular duty, the court granted summary judgment against him. Id.
196. 645 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
197. Id. at 313-14.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 314.
201. Id. at 313-14.
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ing injury entirely to him. 20 2 Likewise, Dare and Branco determine that
the danger inherent in sky diving and BMX racing warrants a depar-
ture from the normal duty standard of due care under all the circum-
stances. Branco holds a BMX track owner to a duty not to "create an
extreme risk of injury."203 Dare determines that a sky diving facility
owes a duty not to "materially increase" the odds that the plaintiff
would be injured "beyond those reasonably anticipated by skydiving
participants." 20 4 Although Lamp also focuses on the fact that
motocross is extremely dangerous, it draws the opposite conclusion.
Indeed, Lamp reasons that the track owner must be especially vigilant
about its patrons' safety due to the heightened chance of injury. 20 5
Thus, Lamp holds that a comparatively trivial misdeed-failing to re-
move an obstacle several feet outside the track's perimeter-
amounted not just to negligence, but to willful and wanton
misconduct.206
The problem, once again, is the slipperiness of the reasonable-
ness concept in the extreme sports context. Although vendors owe a
duty not to negligently increase inherent risks, in recurring factual
circumstances, courts sometimes shift the duty line that separates
plaintiffs from defendants, carving out special definitions of "negli-
gence." The "baseball rule," which holds stadium owners to a duty to
provide enough screened seats for the number of fans who can be
expected to desire them, is one such example. 20 7 The heightened
202. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 925-26
(Ct. App. 1996) (noting the dangers of rock climbing). Indeed, Regents seems to hold that
a plaintiff who is injured by a dangerous sport's inherent risks can never recover. Accord-
ing to the court, because in rock climbing "a fall can occur at anytime, regardless of the
negligence of one's coparticipants," the fact that the defendant misplaced the rope
anchors was irrelevant. Id. at 926. This is clearly wrong. Under the duty not to increase
inherent risks, the proper inquiry is not the kind of injury the plaintiff suffered, but the
manner in which he was injured. A defendant's negligence violates the duty not to increase
inherent risks even if it causes an injury that occurs frequently during the particular activ-
ity. Indeed, the no duty rule does not "relieve a defendant [from] liability for negligence,
because inherent risks 'are not those created by a defendant's negligence but rather by the
nature of the activity itself."' Bennett v. Hidden Valley Golf & Ski, Inc., 318 F.3d 868, 877
(8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Martin v. Buzan, 857 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Mo. 1993)).
203. Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 398 (Ct. App. 1995).
204. Dare v. Freefall Adventures, 793 A.2d 125, 133 (N.J. 2002).
205. See Lamp, 645 N.W.2d at 314 (explaining that "motocross racing involve[s] high
rates of speed and .. .it [i]s common for racers to leave the track during the race").
206. Id. at 314 (noting that the tree stump stood "outside [the] perimeter of the
racetrack").
207. See Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. District, 424 N.E.2d 531,533 (N.Y. 1981); Bellezzo
v. State, 851 P.2d 847, 853 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635
N.W.2d 219, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Swagger v. City of Crystal, 379 N.W.2d 183, 185
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duty of common carriers is another.20 8 Yet what makes extreme sports
unique-and why courts struggle to define what constitutes reasona-
ble care in such activities-is that they feature conduct by both parties
that, considered in isolation, would justify asking them to bear a
greater share of the cost of accidents. On the one hand, as Regents,
Branco, and Dare recognize, the plaintiffs decision to engage in a risky
endeavor should enable defendants to reasonably undertake fewer
safety precautions than might otherwise be necessary. However, as
Lamp acknowledges, the defendant's provision of a risky activity
should require exercise of the utmost care. Each point of view is half-
correct; together, they are wholly right. Because the duty not to in-
crease inherent risks test centers on the meaning of "negligence" dur-
ing the course of activities that already seem to be unreasonable,
decisions will necessarily reflect the whims of individual judges rather
than any neutral principles.
3. Extreme Sports and Secondary Reasonable Assumption of Risk
When a defendant's breach of duty injures a plaintiff, the jury
should award full damages unless the plaintiff has also been negligent.
Extreme sports often hurt people who have not been careless at all.20 9
Thus, the only potential basis for reducing a plaintiffs recovery fre-
quently will be the bare decision to engage in a high risk sport. Of
course, tort law has long imposed liability only when a litigant's behav-
ior falls below the standard of a reasonably prudent person. Indeed,
twenty-four states210 and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act do not
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 777 A.2d 380, 384
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (applying a screening-based test to hockey); Hobby v. City
of Durham, 569 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901
P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah 1995).
208. See, e.g., Bethel v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1214 (N.Y. 1998) (not-
ing the rule "imposing duty upon common carriers of 'the exercise of the utmost care, so far
as human skill and foresight can go,' for the safety of their passengers in transit") (quoting
Kelly v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 20 N.E. 383, 385 (N.Y. 1889) (emphasis supplied by Bethel).
209. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 926
(noting that "[i]nherent in the sport of rock-climbing is the fact a fall can occur at
anytime").
210. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (Michie 2002); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h
(West 1958 & Supp. 2003)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.81(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 (2000 & Supp. 2002);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-31 (Michie 2002); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (Michie 1998 & Supp.
2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1994 & Supp.
2002); LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231, § 85 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 2003); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 185 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-141 (Michie 2002); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
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allow a jury to reduce a plaintiffs recovery unless it first determines
that his behavior was unreasonable. 21 1 Because the decision to engage
in an extreme sport cannot be unreasonable without making the de-
fendant's provision of the sport also unreasonable, a plaintiff who is
not otherwise negligent should in theory recover in full. 212 This con-
clusion, however, does not sit well with some courts and legisla-
tures.213 Twelve jurisdictions' comparative fault statutes either define
fault broadly enough to encompass reasonable behavior or authorize
juries to decrease damages based on a plaintiffs assumption of risk.214
In addition, two state supreme courts have claimed that a jury
may reduce a plaintiff's recovery even for reasonable behavior. First,
23, §§ 13-14 (West 1987 & Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-01-04 (1996 & Supp.
2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-
9-2 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2002); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 1988 & Supp. 2003); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997 & Supp.
2002); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (Michie 2001).
211. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless
toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to
strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable as-
sumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent.., and unrea-
sonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT Acr § 1 (b) U.L.A. (West 2004) (emphasis added).
212. Of course, a plaintiff could engage in unreasonable conduct during the sport that
causes his injury. In that case, the jury could properly reduce his recovery under compara-
tive fault. See infta, text accompanying notes 355-56.
213. The view that juries may reduce recovery on the basis of risky but not unreasona-
ble conduct is known as "secondary reasonable assumption of risk."
214. See Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 (West Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-
122 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (West 2002); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2003);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (West. Supp. 2003); OR. REv. STAT. § 31.600 (West 2003);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-38 (2002).
In Hams v. The Ark, 810 P.2d 226, 232 (Colo. 1992), the Colorado Supreme Court
held that one such statute survived an equal protection challenge despite the fact that it
permitted ajury to reduce a plaintiffs recovery for reasonable conduct but conditioned a
defendant's liability on unreasonable behavior. Id. at 229. The statute authorizes damage
reduction when a plaintiff "voluntarily or unreasonably exposes herself to injury." Id. at 228
(quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111) (emphasis added). The court noted that plaintiffs'
legal entitlements have never mirrored those of defendants. Id. at 231. Instead, doctrines
like contributory negligence and assumption of risk traditionally precluded a plaintiff from
recovering damages, but had no defendant-side analogue. Id. at 233.
Similarly, although the Third Restatement rejects "all forms of implied assumption of
risk," one of its drafters casually mentions that "a player's entering a game might constitute
negligence and thereby reduce [their] recovery." William Powers, Jr., Sports, Assumption of
Risk, and the New Restatement, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 771, 775 (1999) (emphasis added).
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in Kirk v. Washington State University,2 15 the Washington Supreme
Court held that a jury could reduce a plaintiffs damages because she
chose to join her university's cheerleading team. The university relo-
cated cheerleading practices from a padded room to an Astroturf
field. 216 The plaintiff fell during a maneuver where she leapt onto the
shoulders of another cheerleader. 2 17 The jury found the university
negligent for not supervising the practice or warning the squad about
the unforgiving Astroturf surface .2 1  Yet the jury also reduced the
plaintiffs damages by twenty-seven percent.2 1 9 On appeal, she argued
that, because her conduct was reasonable, there was no basis for low-
ering her recovery.220 The court rejected this argument, opining that
[the view] that reasonable implied assumption of risk should not
serve to diminish the amount of plaintiffs recovery.., is seriously
flawed. When a person's conduct under the facts is truly voluntary
and when he knows of the specific risk he is to encounter, this is a
form of responsibility or fault that the jury should evaluate. Those
who argue that the 'jury cannot do this' have not met too many
jurors.2 2 1
But two years later, an unlikely source cast doubt on Kirk. In Ley-
endecker v. Cousins,222 a Washington appellate court held that a log-
ger's decision to walk near a spinning helicopter rotor did not
constitute primary assumption of risk.22 3 Then, in dicta, the court ex-
plained that because the state comparative fault statute only men-
tioned "unreasonable assumption of risk" as a damage-reducing
factor, Kirk could not have meant what it said. 224 Indeed, the court
noted, "if a person acts reasonably, that person's conduct, ipsofacto, is
not negligent ... and has been, by definition, free from blame."225





220. Id. at 290-91.
221. Id. at 292 (quoting VICTOR SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.5, at 180 (2d
ed. 1986)).
222. 770 P.2d 675 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
223. Id. at 678-79.
224. Id. at 684 n.2 (citations omitted).
225. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 68, at
497-98 (5th ed. 1984)). Ironically, Kirk cited this treatise with disapproval. SeeKirk v. Wash.
State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 291 (Wash. 1992) (commenting that the treatise's reasoning was
inapplicable because the court was not retaining assumption of risk as a total bar); see also
Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 508 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Because this form of the
doctrine involves reasonable conduct, i.e., faultless conduct, it is clear that [it] cannot have
any role in comparative fault analysis."); Sheppard v. Midway R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 S.W.2d
257, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that "reasonable assumption of risk ... is not fault").
Summer 2004] EXTREME SPORTS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
Subsequently, in Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort,2 2 6 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court retreated from Kirk. In Scott, the court ex-
plained that Kirk actually held that because the plaintiff "continued to
practice on a dangerous surface, without instruction, she may have
'unreasonably assumed the risk,' i.e., have been contributorily negli-
gent."2 27 This is, however, revisionist history: Kirk never mentions the
possibility that the cheerleader's conduct may have been unreasona-
ble. To the contrary, Kirk explicitly claims to "determine the status of
implied reasonable assumption of risk."228 Scott's reading of Kirk there-
fore suggests that the court has now abandoned the position that ju-
ries may reduce a plaintiff's damages based on his bare decision to
participate in a risky activity.
Nevertheless, later that same year, in dicta in Knight v. Jewett,229
the California Supreme Court cited Kirk for the proposition that
a jury in a 'secondary assumption of risk' case would be entitled to
take into consideration a plaintiffs voluntary action in choosing to
engage in an unusually risky sport, whether or not the plaintiffs
decision to encounter the risk should be characterized as unrea-
sonable, in determining whether the plaintiff properly should bear
some share of responsibility for the injuries he or she suffered. 2 30
At first blush, the notion that ajury may reduce a plaintiffs dam-
ages based on his decision to take part in a risky recreational activity
sounds logical. Common sense suggests that a plaintiff should pay for
his injuries if he deliberately places himself in harm's way. After all, if
a plaintiff "engages in classic assumption of risk conduct, he is in part
responsible for his injury." 23 1 In addition, comparative fault "is a flexi-
ble, commonsense concept."23 2 Courts already force juries to balance
the culpability of dissimilar conduct, such as a defendant's strict liabil-
ity and a plaintiffs negligence. 23 3 Allowing juries to compare a defen-
dant's negligence and a plaintiff's risky behavior simply extends this
principle.
However, despite its superficial appeal, the proposition that ajury
may reduce a plaintiffs recovery for hazardous but not unreasonable
conduct is specious. First, although courts ask juries to compare the
226. 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992).
227. Id. at 14.
228. Kirk, 746 P.2d at 291(emphasis added). "[Secondary reasonable assumption of
risk's] status has been left undecided by our earlier opinions." Id. at 289.
229. 834 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion).
230. Id. at 707.
231. VICTOR SCHWARZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.5, at 180 (2d ed. 1986).
232. Knight, 834 P.2d at 707.
233. See, e.g., Simons, Reflections, supra note 31, at 526.
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blameworthiness of dissimilar conduct, such as a defendant's strict lia-
bility and a plaintiffs negligence, this procedure still conditions dam-
age reduction on negligence. Because the negligence concept embodies
tort law's fundamental fairness and efficiency concerns, it cannot be
dispensed with cavalierly. 234 In fact, tort law should require a plaintiff
to exhibit more culpability than a defendant before he is held legally
accountable. A plaintiffs decision to confront a risk often endangers
only himself. This is especially true in the context of extreme sports,
which are "very much individual events." 235 Defendants, on the other
hand, hold themselves open to the public. The defendant's behav-
ior-providing a risky sport to many people-is more likely to cause
injuries than a single plaintiffs decision to participate in such an activ-
ity. If tort law must deter one of the two forms of conduct, surely it
should not be that of the plaintiff that imposes fewer social costs.2 36
In addition, as noted, when a defendant facilitates a plaintiffs
participation in a risky sport, their conduct is closely linked. The
plaintiff could never have taken part in the sport without the defen-
dant's efforts. The defendant would not have provided the sport if the
plaintiff had not chosen to participate in it. Allowing a jury to reduce
a plaintiffs recovery because of his choice to engage in risky, but not
unreasonable behavior is a form of plaintiffs-side strict liability. 23 7 Yet
the no duty rule allows defendants to provide an activity and avoid
liability for clearly foreseeable injuries. In fact, to trigger secondary
assumption of risk, not only must the defendant have been blamewor-
thy in the same sense that the plaintiff has been-both have chosen to
234. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91
GEO. L.J. 585, 631 (2003).
235. See, e.g., Talk Nation (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 13, 2002), 2002 WL 3296805.
236. SeeRossman v. La Grega, 270 N.E.2d.313, 317 (N.Y. 1971) ("[B]etween one whose
negligent act does harm to others and one whose negligent act does harm to him-
self . . . the same mechanistic standard ought not to be applied undifferentially as to
both."); Simons, Puzzling Doctrine, supra note 139, at 1718. As Simons notes:
A victim often faces a very difficult choice: suffer a risk of harm to his own person
or property, or sacrifice some other personal interest .... The victim has chosen
to risk suffering harm, even serious personal injury. The fact that the victim has
made that painful choice gives significant reason for caution before characteriz-
ing the choice as negligent. The motive of self-protection is strong: a victim's
failure to respond to that motive sometimes evidences a powerful countervailing
value.
Id.
237. Id. at 1702, stating:
A true negligence theory of contributory fault supposes that the plaintiff should
have acted otherwise by taking a specified precaution; and if we do not so sup-
pose, but we still believe that plaintiff should be disentitled from full recovery,
then plaintiff's disentitlement must rest on a kind of strict liability.
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involve themselves in a hazardous activity-but the defendant must
have been additionally negligent as well. Therefore, despite the com-
plete interdependence of the litigants' behavior, the legal conse-
quences that flow from party status under such a regime are at
opposite ends of the tort spectrum.2 38
Moreover, although courts slavishly adhere to the objective rea-
sonable person paradigm when considering an injurer's negligence,
they occasionally evaluate a victim's negligence by a subjective stan-
dard. Indeed, "[w]hatever our capacities, we are expected to exercise
reasonable care when we impose risks on others, but we are allowed
our weaknesses and idiosyncrasies when we are protecting ourselves
from the carelessness of others." 23 9 For example, people with im-
paired mental abilities are held to an objective duty of reasonable care
as defendants but a subjective standard for the purposes of evaluating
their negligence as plaintiffs. 240 Similar rules sometimes apply to vic-
tims with unusual religious convictions. 241 Also, just as there are de-
fense-side no duty rules, courts occasionally decline to consider the
possibility of reducing a plaintiff's recovery altogether. 242 For in-
stance, many states hold that a plaintiffs decision not to wear a
238. The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes these concerns, but nevertheless pro-
vides that a "[p] laintiff s negligence is defined by the applicable standard for a defendant's
negligence." RESTATEMENT (THmR) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 (2003). Ac-
cording to the Reporter's Note, although there is a difference between "imposing risks on
oneself and imposing risks on others[,] [t]he distinction is undermined by the fact that, if a
defendant is liable for a plaintiffs injury, the plaintiffs conduct imposes financial risks on
the defendant." Id. at cmt. (a). Whatever merit this reasoning has in general, it simply does
not apply in the extreme sports context. A plaintiffs decision to engage in an extreme
sport may "impose ... financial risks" on a vendor, but it is also the sole source of a
vendor's financial benefits. Indeed, without participants, vendors would not be in business.
239. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 311, 369 (1996) ("Tort law is only tangentially about the risks that we should impose
on ourselves, but centrally about the risks that we should be permitted to impose on
others.").
240. Id. at 371 & nn.207-208.
241. Id. at 371.
242. See Ellen M. Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REv. 996, 1029
(2003). Although Bublick does not mention risky sports, one such category is "when ajury
could consider the plaintiffs choice to be unreasonable, but the choice is one that risks
harm to the plaintiff alone, involves an aspect of plaintiff liberty or autonomy, and is not
reckless." Id. at 1029-30. In these situations, "even when reasonable juries could differ as to
whether the plaintiffs risk to herself was reasonable, courts may leave those decisions to
the plaintiffs autonomous choice rather than to ajury decision." Id. at 1030. The example
she provides is of a plaintiff who chooses to ride with an inexperienced driver. See id. (dis-
cussing Thompson v. Michael, 433 S.E.2d 853 (S.C. 1993)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. d (2003) (acknowledging the existence of
plaintiffs-side no duty rules).
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seatbelt cannot be introduced into evidence as failure to anticipatorily
mitigate damages. 243 In similar contexts, then, courts honor a plain-
tiffs choice to engage in a risky activity rather than relegating the
nebulous question of its objective reasonableness to the jury.
Thus, there is no satisfactory solution to the secondary reasonable
assumption of risk problem. On the one hand, it seems fair to reduce
a plaintiff's recovery based on his decision to engage in an extreme
sport. However, to do so would flout tort law's fundamental goal of
reducing accidents. The fact that high risk recreational activities are
impossible to characterize as either reasonable or unreasonable
wreaks havoc with the no duty rule.
B. Implied Consent, Waivers, and Minors
Express assumption of risk allows a vendor to shift loss from a
sport's inherent risks and its own negligence by contract. The doc-
trine does not apply to minors, however, because contract law regards
their consent as voidable. Primary assumption of risk, on the other
hand, frees vendors from a duty to protect plaintiffs against a sport's
inherent risks, but forbids them from negligently increasing those
risks. Some courts contend that this rule is based on the fact that
sports are reasonable. 244 Others believe that it represents a policy di-
rective to avoid chilling athletic participation or altering a sport's fun-
damental nature. This section discusses yet another rationale for
primary assumption of risk: that it stems from the plaintiffs "implied
consent" to face certain dangers.
The conventional wisdom is that it does not matter whether pri-
mary assumption of risk is a quotidian duty analysis or a principle that
springs from the plaintiff's implied consent. For example, in Richie-
Gamester v. Berkley, 245 the Michigan Supreme Court claimed that
[t]here are myriad ways to describe the legal effect of voluntarily
participating in a recreational activity. The act of stepping onto the
field of play may be described as 'consent to the inherent risks of
the activity,' or ... participants' mutual agreement to play a game
may be described as an 'implied contract' between all the partici-
pants, or a voluntary participant could be described as 'assuming
the risks' inherent in the sport. No matter what terms are used, the
basic premise is the same: When people engage in a recreational
243. See, e.g., Ramrattan v. Burger King Corp., 656 F. Supp. 522, 527 (D. Md. 1987);
Churning v. Staples, 628 P.2d 180, 181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
244. See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. 1994).
245. 597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999).
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activity, they have voluntarily subjected themselves to certain risks
inherent in that activity.
246
The conventional wisdom is wrong. To see why, consider Scott v.
Pacific West Mountain Resort.24 7 In Scott, the twelve-year-old plaintiff en-
rolled in skiing lessons. 248 His mother signed a release exonerating
the company that provided the lessons from liability for inherent risks
and negligence. 249 While skiing down a slalom race course, the plain-
tiff veered off course, struck a tow-rope shack, and suffered severe
head injuries.2 5 0 His parents sued the ski school and the resort that
owned the slope.2 5' After the trial court entered summary judgment
in favor of both defendants, the Washington Supreme Court granted
direct review.2 52 The state high court explained that although it had
"upheld exculpatory clauses in favor of private parties in various high
risk sports-related situations," whether a parent could waive a child's
claim presented "a very different question."253 Noting the myriad of
protections state law accorded children, the courtjoined "[n]umerous
cases in other jurisdictions [that] have considered the validity of
preinjury releases signed by a parent and concluded that such releases
do not bar the child's cause of action. '2
54
The court then considered whether primary assumption of risk
barred the plaintiffs claim. The court explained that in Washington
the doctrine "arises where a plaintiff has impliedly consented . . .to
relieve defendant of a duty to plaintiff regarding specific known and
appreciated risks. '2 55 Combing the record, the court determined that
the tow-rope shack may have been unreasonably close to the race
course and that the plaintiff did not consent to face such negli-
gence. 256 Yet this should have been a foregone conclusion. After hold-
ing that the plaintiff could not expressly agree under any
circumstances to relieve the defendants from liability, the court could
not possibly have determined that he implicitly acquiesced to such an
246. Id. at 523-24.
247. 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992). Scott's holding on the issue of secondary reasonable
assumption of risk is discussed above. See supra Part II.A.3.




252. Id. at 9.
253. Id. at 11.
254. Id. at 12 (italics omitted).
255. Id. at 13 (italics omitted).
256. Id. at 12-16.
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arrangement. Indeed, under Washington law, "the elements of proof
are the same for both" express and primary assumption of risk.
257
Similarly, Florida courts employ the single term "express assump-
tion of risk" to refer both to "contracts not to sue for injury or
loss . . . as well as situations in which actual consent exists such as
where one voluntarily participates in a contact sport."2 5 8 In Kuehner v.
Green,259 the Florida Supreme Court drew parallels between liability
releases and situations in which a plaintiff engages in an activity with
well-known risks:
Express assumption of risk, as it applies in the context of contact
sports, rests upon the plaintiffs voluntary consent to take certain
chances. This principle may be better expressed in terms of waiver.
When a participant volunteers to take certain chances he waives his
right to be free from those bodily contacts inherent in the chances
taken.260
Several years later, in Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc.,26 1 a fourteen-
year-old equestrian was hurt when her horse suddenly galloped into a
tree.2 62 A Florida appellate court struck down the liability release she
had signed, reasoning that the state's strong interest in protecting mi-
nors allowed her to disaffirm the contract. 263 Although courts in other
jurisdictions had dismissed similar claims stemming from horseback-
riding accidents under primary assumption of risk, 264 the Dilallo court
did not consider whether Florida's version of the doctrine applied.
Nor could it. Indeed, as in Scott, the court's conclusion that the plain-
tiff could void her written promise to hold the defendant harmless
would be impossible to square with the determination that she had
implicitly consented to the identical arrangement. Because private ex-
changes maximize wealth, the law erects few impediments to contract
257. Dorr v. Big Creek Wood Prods., Inc., 927 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 288 (Wash. 1987)).
258. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977). Most states call the latter
circumstance "primary assumption of risk." See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
259. 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983).
260. Id. at 80 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
261. 687 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
262. Id. at 354.
263. Id. at 357.
264. See Cooperman v. David, 214 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying Wyoming
law) ("A horse ... simply begin [ning] to gallop for no apparent reason . . . clearly would
qualify as [an] inherent risk... of horseback riding."); Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936
P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1997) (acknowledging "established authority recognizing reasonable limi-
tations on the responsibility of others for the risk of injury arising from the skittishness of
horses").
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formation. 265 However, in the rare situation where public policy for-
bids the parties from binding themselves in contracts, the ban is abso-
lute: no other doctrine can give legal effect to their intentions. 266
Thus, express assumption of risk's prohibitions should trump primary
assumption of risk.267 Accordingly, in states that subscribe to the con-
tractarian implied consent rationale, ajudgment that a minor plaintiff
cannot be bound by a liability waiver also defeats the primary assump-
tion of risk defense.268
This poses a severe problem for owners of recreational facilities.
Children aged five to fourteen suffer sports-related injuries at more
than twice the national rate.269 Medical expenses from these accidents
total nearly $500 million.2 70 In addition, the majority of extreme
sports participants are under the age of eighteen. 2 71 Yet in jurisdic-
265. See Thomas W. Merill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Prop-
erty: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (noting in contract law "there
is a potentially infinite range of promises that the law will honor").
266. See Thomas C. Galligan Jr., Contortions Along the Boundary Between Contracts and
Torts, 69 TUL. L. REv. 457, 460 (1994) (author notes that "[w]hile contract law generally
turns on the idea that people can do as they choose, as long as they do not step outside its
very broad contours, tort law imposes more drastic limits on individual freedom").
267. States arguably have a stronger policy interest in striking down waivers that insu-
late defendants from negligently harming a child than those that simply protect them from
liability stemming from an activity's inherent risks. However, when a court strikes down a
waiver, it generally invalidates the entire contract. See, e.g., Harmon v. Mount Hood Mead-
ows, Ltd., 932 P.2d 92, 95 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (entire release void absent intent to make
invalid provision severable); Farina v. Mount Bachelor, Inc., 66 F.3d 233, 236 (9th Cir.
1995) (same result).
268. In addition to Florida and Washington, Missouri courts recognize an explicitly
contractual version of the "implied consent" doctrine. See Sheppard v. Midway Sch. Dist.,
904 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("Implied primary assumption of risk, like ex-
press assumption of risk, is based on consent by the plaintiff, but does not possess 'the
additional ceremonial and evidentiary weight of an express agreement.'") (quoting Kirk v.
Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 288 (1987)). However, in Bennett v. Hidden Valley Golf &
Ski, Inc., 318 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2003), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Mis-
souri law, upheld the trial court's determination that primary assumption of risk barred
the claim of a sixteen-year-old skier. Id. at 877. The plaintiff apparently argued that a spe-
cial standard should apply to minors, but did not point the court's attention to the conflict
between express assumption of risk's exception for minors and the state's contractarian
"implied consent" rationale for primary assumption of risk. Id. at 874 n.5.
269. See 9J. M. Conn, Et AI., Sports and Recreation Related Injury Episodes in the U.S.
Population, 1997-99, Injury Prevention 123 (June 1, 2003); AMERICAN SPORTS DATA, INC.,
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF SPORTS INJURIES IN U.S. (2003), available at http://
www.americansportsdata.com/sports-injuryl.asp (last accessed Feb. 6, 2004) ("Youthful
sports injuries are also being fueled by the increasingly popular non-traditional sector of
Extreme Sports.").
270. See 9 CONN, ET AL., supra note 269, at 123.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. Sky diving, which is regulated by the
Federal Aviation Administration, requires participants to be at least sixteen years old. See
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tions that adhere to the contractarian implied consent rationale,
sponsoring business entities have no means whatsoever to contractu-
ally bar tort claims brought by their largest class of patrons.
Other implied consent jurisdictions differentiate between the ele-
ments of proof required for primary and express assumption of risk.
In these states, courts assert that "[p] rimary assumption of risk occurs
when an individual, by voluntarily engaging in an activity, consents to
those risks that are inherent in and arise by virtue of the nature of the
activity itself."272 Because no court in these jurisdictions has addressed
a minor's claim in the sports setting, it is unclear how the rule that
allows minors to void contracts will affect this conceptualization of the
no duty rule. On one hand, in these states, express and primary as-
sumption of risk technically feature different types of consent: the for-
mer involves the plaintiffs agreement to waive a tort claim, while the
latter involves the plaintiffs agreement to "take his chances" by taking
part in an activity. 2 73
Nevertheless, there may not be meaningful differences between a
child's consent to waive a tort claim and his willingness to "take his
chances"-especially when the activity involves a substantial risk of
harm. The rule that allows minors to void contracts stems from the
fact that such individuals "lack the capacity to evaluate critically
[their] own interests and desires" and "determine which of them
should be encouraged rather than suppressed. '" 274 Similarly, it is well-
established that young people have little conception of their own mor-
Derek J. Moore, Leap of Faith: Law Change Allows Santa Rosa Boy, 16, to Make First Parachute
Jump, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), Apr. 30, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 6419254. However,
children as young as five years old are permitted to ride motocross. See Will Oremus, Partici-
pants Say Motocross Accident Just Freak Occurrence, LAs VEGAS SUN, Aug. 22, 2003, at 1, 2003
WL 62389840.
272. Gyuriak v. Millice, 775 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted);
see also Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 861 F.2d 502, 510 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Arkansas
law) ("[P] rimary assumption of risk is limited to implied consent to risks that are inherent
in the activity.") (italics omitted); Schneider v. Erickson, 654 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002) ("By voluntarily entering into a situation where there are well-known, inciden-
tal risks, the plaintiff consents to look out for himself and relieve the defendant of his
duty.").
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c(1) (1965). Ken Simons argues
that "the term consent can be misleading .... [C]ourts characterize [a plaintiffs] behavior
as consensual because they conclude that such a plaintiff is not entitled to relief, without
regard to whether he intends to waive his tort claim." Simons, Full Preference, supra note 4,
at 224-25. Of course, this provides no explanation for why courts conclude that particular
plaintiffs are not entitled to relief.
274. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 789
(1983).
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tality and grossly underestimate the odds of being injured.2 75 Eliza-
beth Scott and Laurence Steinberg note that
scientific evidence indicates that teens are simply less competent
decisionmakers than adults, largely because typical features of ado-
lescent psycho-social development contribute to immature judg-
ment. Adolescent capacities for autonomous choice, self-
management, risk perception and calculation of future conse-
quences are deficient as compared to those of adults, and these
traits influence decisionmaking in ways that can lead to risky
conduct.
2 7 6
Thus, it is doubtful that this incarnation of the "implied consent" ap-
proach can justifiably give legal effect to the inference that a child's
participation in a sport manifests his willingness to encounter certain
dangers. 2 77
One might object that this critique would have applied equally to
the subjective assumption of risk defense, which some claim was also
based on consent.278 Indeed, the rule that contracts made by minors
275. See Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHIATRY
PUB. POL'v & LAW 3, 19 (1997) ("Theory and research suggests that adolecents are more
likely than adults to give greater weight to anticipated gains than to possible loses or nega-
tive risks."); Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DuKE L.J. 1133, 1137-41
(1998) (noting that young people are aware of the dangers of smoking as a general matter,
but stubbornly refuse to acknowledge that their own smoking puts them at risk).
276. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 801
(2002).
277. For example, in Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1997), the New York high
court adopted the duty-based implied consent rationale for primary assumption of risk. Id.
at 207-08. Yet, rather than using the plaintiffs implied consent as a sweeping license to
allow defendants to undertake fewer safety precautions, the court explicitly tied the defen-
dant's duty of care to the plaintiff's subjective knowledge and expectations. Id. at 208.
Thus, the court held that primary assumption of risk depends on whether a participant has
"not only knowledge of the injury-causing defect but also appreciation of the resultant risk,
but awareness of risk is not to be determined in a vacuum. It is, rather, to be assessed
against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff." Id. at 208
(quoting Maddox v. City of New York, 487 N.E.2d 553, 556 (N.Y. 1985) (citations omit-
ted)). After Morgan, New York courts shied away from applying assumption of risk to mi-
nors. See, e.g., Blanco v. Elmont Union Free Sch. Dist., 687 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1999) (declining to apply primary assumption of risk to eleven-year-old plaintiff who was
injured during a relay race even though "it could be argued that the [danger] was gener-
ally open and obvious").
278. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 715 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion) (Kennard,
J., dissenting) ("The defense of assumption of risk, whether the risk is assumed expressly or
by implication, is based on consent."); Simons, Puzzling Doctrine, supra note 139, at 1704
("[A]ssumption of risk [is] a doctrine that rests on the victim's consent.").
In addition, the New York Court of Appeals once analogized between primary assump-
tion of risk and the defense of consent to an intentional tort. See Turcotte v. Fell, 502
N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986) (calling primary assumption of risk "'the same as where the
plaintiff consents to the infliction of what would otherwise be an intentional tort'") (quot-
ing PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 68, at 480-81 (5th ed. 1984)). Notably, however, the de-
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are voidable dates back to the turn of the twentieth century.279 Long
after it had taken root, courts saw no anomaly in barring the claims of
child plaintiffs under the doctrine of assumption of risk.280
However, the traditional assumption of risk defense was markedly
different than the modern "implied consent" approach. While the for-
mer was based wholly on the plaintiffs subjective knowledge and ex-
pectations, 281 the latter unequivocally mirrors contract law in the way
that it focuses on the fact that the parties have "voluntarily entered
into a relationship. '" 28 2 In addition, the "traditional assumption of risk
doctrine was much too broad"2 3 and applied to situations in which a
purely consensual rationale would not have reached the same re-
sult.28 4 Thus, because courts viewed the traditional assumption of risk
defense as an independent principle-and not just grounded in the
plaintiffs consent-they had no reason to consider whether it con-
flicted with the rule that juveniles may void contracts.
Also, rather than undermining the claim that the two doctrines
conflict, a review of past cases reveals that courts have consistently ex-
pressed qualms about applying assumption of risk to minors. For ex-
ample, courts generally presume that adults appreciate the gravity of
obvious dangers, but sometimes refuse to bar children's claims in the
fense of consent to an intentional tort also carves out special protective rules for children.
Indeed, in the intentional tort context, as in contract law, "the apparent consent of a per-
son without legal capacity to give consent, such as a child . . . is ineffective." People v.
Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439, 447 (Ct. App. 1967); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122, (D.C.
Cir. 1941) ("[T]here is general recognition of the fact that many persons by reason of their
youth are incapable of intelligent decision, as the result of which public policy demands
legal protection of their personal as well as their property rights."); Baird v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 360 N.E.2d 288, 296 (Mass. 1977) (noting the general rule that minors may not con-
sent to medical procedures in absence of emergency); King, supra note 103, at 695
("[M]inors... are held legally incapable of consenting to at least some types of potentially
harmful or offensive contacts."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b (noting
that consent is only effective if a child is "capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and
probable consequences of the conduct").
279. See, e.g., Chambers v. Chambers, 6 So. 659, 660-61 (La. 1889) (voiding minor's
contract).
280. See, e.g., Parzych v. Town of Branford, 136 A.2d 223, 225 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957)
(barring claims of minor plaintiffs who were injured when they illegally entered the defen-
dant's cabin and experimented with gunpowder they found there).
281. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1965).
282. Sheppard v. Midway R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995);
Schneider v. Erickson 654 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
283. Simons, Reflections, supra note 31, at 483.
284. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 706 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion) (criticizing the notion
that assumption of risk should be based on consent); Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, supra
note 31, at 839 (distinguishing between "consent to the physical injury" and "consent to
the legal injury").
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same circumstances. 28 5 Likewise, many states impose rigorous eviden-
tiary burdens on defendants seeking to prove that a child plaintiff as-
sumed the risk. 28 6
Moreover, problems with applying assumption of risk to minor
plaintiffs may extend even beyond the tension between their tradi-
tional contractual protections and the consensual justification for pri-
mary assumption of risk. For example, California courts disapprove of
the "implied consent" rationale2 8 7 and uphold liability releases signed
by minors.28 8 Nevertheless, while twenty-four of the thirty-four pub-
lished California appellate decisions involving adult plaintiffs in the
sports setting upheld summary judgment for the defendant,289 only
285. For example, in Schentzel v. Philadelphia National League Club, 96 A.2d 181, 186 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1953), the court applied assumption of risk to a forty-seven year-old woman who
was struck by a foul ball at a baseball game. The plaintiff had only seen the sport on televi-
sion. Id. at 183. Yet the court reasoned that she must have been aware of the hazards of
attending a baseball game because:
[i]t strains our collective imagination to visualize the situation of the wife of a
man obviously interested in the game, whose children view the games on the
home television set, and who lives in a metropolitan community, so far removed
from that knowledge as not to be chargeable with it.
Id. at 186. Conversely, in Atlanta v. Merritt, 323 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), the court
declined to apply assumption of risk to bar the claim of an eight-year-old plaintiff who was
injured by a foul ball because "[t]he record of the present case ... [has] nothing in it
which demands the conclusion that appellee understood the risk of occupying the place
he occupied and assumed that risk." Id. at 682.
286. See, e.g., DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Allen, 561 S.E.2d 202, 206 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (noting that a seven-year-old plaintiff "can only be said to have assumed the risk if
the danger was patent, obvious, and known to her and she was able to appreciate and avoid
it"); Bait. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 705 A.2d 1144, 1157 (Md. 1998) (upholding trial
court's refusal to give assumption of risk instruction in case where eleven-year-old plaintiff
was electrocuted after climbing the defendant's utility pole); Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen, 641
So. 2d 231, 237 (Ala. 1994) ("the question whether a child plaintiff is capable of assump-
tion of the risk.., requires] an even higher burden on the defendant"); Schorah v. Carey,
331 A.2d 383, 385 (Del. 1975) ("requiring a 'reasonable certitude,' that there is no issue of
fact as to whether the child appreciated the full risk involved") (emphasis in original).
287. See Knight, 834 P.2d at 706 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion).
288. See Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 805 (Ct. App.
1998). This is far and away the minority rule. See supra text accompanying note 101.
289. See Cheong v. Antablin, 946 P.2d 817, 820-21 (Cal. 1997); Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d
724, 728 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion); Knight, 834 P.2d at 712 (Cal. 1992) (plurality
opinion); Moser v. Ratinoff, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 205-206 (Ct. App. 2003); Whelihan v.
Espinoza, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 883, 890 (Ct. App. 2003); Nemarnik v. L.A. Kings Hockey Club,
127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10, 17-18 (Ct. App. 2002); Rodrigo v. Koryo Martial Arts, 122 Cal. Rptr.
2d 832, 839-41 (Ct. App. 2002); Mastro v. Petrick, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 190-91 (Ct. App.
2001); Kane v. Nat'l Ski Patrol Sys., Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 605-06 (Ct. App. 2001);
Distefano v. Forester, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 831 (Ct. App. 2001); Am. Golf Corp. v. Supe-
rior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683, 689-90 (Ct. App. 2000); Record v. Reason, 86 Cal. Rptr.
2d 547, 556 (Ct. App. 1999); Shelly v. Stepp, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 327-28 (Ct. App. 1999);
Domenghini v. Evans, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 919 (Ct. App. 1998); Dilger v. Moyles, 63 Cal.
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six of the fifteen cases brought by child plaintiffs reached that re-
sult.290 In an early important article on assumption of risk, John Dia-
mond noted that jurisdictions that take different approaches to
Rptr. 2d 591, 594 (Ct. App. 1997); Mosca v. Lichtenwalter, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 61 (Ct. App.
1997); Bushnell v. Japanese-American Religious & Cultural Ctr., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 676
(Ct. App. 1996); Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 822 (Ct. App.1996);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 926 (Ct. App. 1996);
Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 858-59 (Ct. App. 1995);
Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 70 (Ct. App. 1995); O'Donoghue v.
Bear Mountain Ski Resort, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 469 (Ct. App.1994); Harrold v. RollingJ
Ranch, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 677 (Ct. App. 1993); Stimson v. Carlson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670,
673 (Ct. App.1992).
Cases in which courts denied summary judgment include: Saffro v. Elite Racing, Inc.,
119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 502 (Ct. App. 2002); Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d
265, 274 (Ct. App. 2001); Van Dyke v. S.KI. Ltd., 79 Cal. Rptr. 775, 779 (Ct. App.1998);
Lowe v. Calif. League of Prof'1 Baseball, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 111-12 (Ct. App. 1997);
Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 252 (Ct. App. 1995); Freeman v.
Hale, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 423 (Ct. App. 1994); Yancey v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
777, 781-82 (Ct. App. 1994); Bush v. Parents Without Partners, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 182
(Ct..App. 1993); Galardi v. Seahorse Riding Club, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270, 271-72 (Ct. App.
1993); Tan v. Goddard, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 93 (Ct. App. 1993).
290. See Lupash v. City of Seal Beach, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 920, 926-27 (Ct. App. 1999)
(barring claim of thirteen-year-old lifeguard); Staten v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
657, 660 (Ct. App. 1996) (primary assumption of risk applies to sixteen-year-old ice skater);
Lilley v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638, 640-41 (Ct. App. 1993) (barring
claim of fourteen-year-old plaintiff who broke his arm during wrestling meet); Aaris v. Las
Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 803 (Ct. App. 1998) (barring claim of
"sophomore in high school injured during gymnastic meet"); Balthazor v. Little League
Baseball, Inc. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 337, 339-40 (Ct. App. 1998) (primary assumption of risk
applies to eleven-year-old plaintiff); West v. Sundown Little League, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849,
853-54 (2002) (primary assumption of risk bars claim of ten-year-old little league baseball
player hit by fly ball during practice).
Cases which denied summary judgment include Kahn v. E. Side High Union Sch.
Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 44 (Cal. 2003) (primary assumption of risk does not apply to fourteen-
year-old plaintiff injured during swim meet); Childs v. County of Santa Barbara, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 823, 827 (Ct. App. 2004) (primary assumption of risk does not apply to eleven-
year-old riding scooter); Giardino v. Brown, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 87 (Ct. App. 2002) (pri-
mary assumption of risk does not apply to eleven-year-old plaintiff injured when her horse
spooked); Shannon v. Rhodes, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 224 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
primary assumption of risk does not apply to six-year-old plaintiff who fell out of water-
skiing boat but reserving question as to whether the doctrine could ever apply to a child
that young); Bjork v. Mason, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 49, 50 (Ct. App. 2000) (primary assumption
of risk does not apply to fifteen-year-old plaintiff struck by tow-rope while riding in inner
tube being pulled by powerboat); Campbell v. Derylo, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 519, 521 (Ct. App.
1999) (primary assumption of risk does not apply to an eleven-year-old skier struck by
defendant's snowboard); Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 399 (Ct.
App. 1995) (primary assumption of risk does not apply to seventeen-year-old BMX bike
rider); Wattenbarger v. Cincinnati Reds, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732, 736 (Ct. App. 1994) (pri-
mary assumption of risk does not apply to seventeen-year-old plaintiff who was injured
during baseball tryout); Lucas v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 79-80
(1993) (primary assumption does not apply to ten-year-old plaintiff injured while engaging
in an impromptu game that involved throwing dirt clods).
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assumption of risk sometimes reach identical results in certain clusters
of cases. 291 Diamond posited that this "suggests the possibility that
there are normative principles governing the appellate courts that are
not articulated in the current alternative doctrine. '" 292 California's le-
nient treatment of minors may reflect a "normative consensus" 29 3 that
barring such plaintiffs' claims under primary assumption of risk em-
bodies outmoded tort principles. 29 4 At the very least, on a pragmatic
level, this suggests that vendors cannot rely on either express or pri-
mary assumption of risk to bar claims brought by child plaintiffs. Ac-
cordingly, a standard that would allow vendors greater certainty but
also incorporates the fairness concerns noted above is proposed by
this Article.
III. Proposal: The Duty to Inform
The fact that extreme sports are impossible to classify as either
reasonable or unreasonable creates many problems. This section con-
tends that holding purveyors of such activities to an additional duty to
take reasonable steps to inform participants of an activity's danger
would eliminate these difficulties. This minor doctrinal adjustment
would allow vendors to cater solely to risk-preferrers and other sensa-
tion-seekers. Warnings would sort out this class of participants in the
fairest possible manner: by letting them vote with their feet. Although
what suffices as reasonable information would depend on the circum-
stances, it should be geared towards assisting potential extreme sports
participants in making a measured judgment about whether a particu-
lar activity is worthwhile. Therefore, at a bare minimum, warnings
should contain statistical information about the sport's injury rates. In
turn, an individual's decision to engage in an activity despite full
291. See Diamond, supra note 62, at 741-42.
292. Id. at 742. Similarly, Peter Schuck has suggested that "assumption of risk, notwith-
standing its ostensible and legally institutionalized character as a 'fact,' is in reality a cultur-
ally constructed and highly normative doctrine, one that is highly responsive to changing
social values." Schuck, supra note 148, at 912.
293. Diamond, supra note 62, at 741.
294. The period in which jurisdictions adopted duty-based approaches to assumption
of risk witnessed a "collection of ... cases [that] could be referred to as 'plaintiffs' greatest
hits."' Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort
Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 603 (1992). Indeed, these changes included abolition of the con-
tributory negligence defense and the recognition of the doctrine of strict products liability.
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962). In addition,
many jurisdictions streamlined complex landowner duty rules into all-encompassing stan-
dards of reasonable care under all the circumstances. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443
P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). In light of these pro-plaintiff changes, manyjudges may feel that
applying assumption of risk to children is anachronistic.
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knowledge of its dangers indicates that, for him, its benefits outweigh
its risks. This kind of deliberate cost-benefit balancing fully accords
with the utility-maximizing purpose of tort law. In addition, there is a
strong argument that providing high risk sports to a self-selected
group of willing participants is normatively reasonable. Thus, because
conditioning participation in a risky activity on unambiguous accept-
ance of its dangers is also reasonable, defendants would ensure that
they too would come down on the right side of the negligence line.
Accordingly, the duty to inform would introduce extreme sports into
the reasonableness concept.
Admittedly, this proposal rests on a series of sweeping behavioral
assumptions. Treating a plaintiffs informed decision to engage in an
activity as evidence that he has consciously weighed risks and benefits
ignores the fact that even people who are aware that injuries occur in
certain activities often systematically underestimate the chance of be-
ing personally affected. 295 Also, people who are prone to making rash
or impulsive decisions may wrongly decide that engaging in a particu-
larly risky activity maximizes their net "good."296 Finally, situational
pressures-such as disapproval from one's peers or the inconvenience
of canceling plans at the last minute-might cause people to partici-
pate in a dangerous activity despite their better judgment.297
But these criticisms are less persuasive than they first seem. First,
the no duty rule subscribes to an even farther-reaching assumption:
295. SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1165, 1180 (2003) (noting that while "smokers overestimate the link between lung
cancer and smoking in general, they simultaneously underestimate their own risk of dying
from lung cancer"); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. Rev. 1051, 1091
(2000), noting:
Even when actors know the actual probability distribution of a particular event,
their predictions as to the likelihood that that event will happen to them are
susceptible to the 'overconfidence bias': the belief that good things are more
likely than average to happen to us and bad things are less likely than average to
happen to us.
296. The potential for poor decision-making may be accentuated by the "conformation
bias.... which is 'the tendency to seek information to confirm our original hypotheses and
beliefs.'" Cass R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1295, 1310 (2003) (quoting ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 147 (6th
ed. 1992)). Thus, people who make rash decisions may not internalize even strongly-
worded warnings.
297. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 136
(2003) ("Our proclivity is to under-estimate the role of situational influences, and to over-
estimate the influence of individual dispositions in explaining people's behavior" is com-
monly known as "fundamental attribution error.").
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that the benefits of any sport outweigh its risks. Also, the objections
noted above do not apply to risk-preferrers, who clearly gain positive
utility from engaging in dangerous sports. 298 In addition, research
about the way people process information suggests that warnings may
be an accurate way to sort out the risk-averse from other participants.
For example, because of a cognitive illusion known as the "availability
heuristic," people tend to overestimate the incidence of high-profile
accidents. 29 9 The media blitz that propelled extreme sports to promi-
nence has emphasized their risk of serious injury.300 Thus, it is doubt-
ful that extreme sports participants would underestimate the
likelihood of being hurt, especially when confronted with specific data
about an activity. Psychologists have also documented that percep-
tions of an activity's risks generally lower an activity's perceived bene-
fit.30 1 Forcing people to make decisions under time pressure
accentuates this phenomenon. 30 2 Thus, there is good reason to be-
lieve that individuals will not follow through with an initial decision to
engage in an extreme sport-despite peer pressure or the hassle of
bowing out at the last minute-unless they truly believe that the activ-
ity's benefits outweigh its risks.
Furthermore, despite the exact same flaws, tort law recognizes a
duty to inform in two similar contexts. Dangerous medical procedures
are difficult to label as either reasonable or unreasonable. Health
care, of course, possesses enormous social value. Yet many forms of
treatment also hold the potential for serious adverse effects. Tort law
resolves this conflict through the doctrine of informed consent, which
requires doctors to disclose the material risks involved with each po-
298. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
299. The "availability heuristic" refers to the idea that people tend to "rely on the ease
to which an instance of a target event can be called to mind," and thus over-estimate the
occurrence of high-profile events. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 556 (2002).
300. See Ramsey, supra note 18, at 1650 (noting that despite widespread media repre-
sentations to the contrary, "scholastic football causes fatal injury or paralysis more often
than rock climbing or sky diving"); Moore, supra note 271 (noting that thirty-five people in
the United States were killed last year while sky diving);Jen Fish, Woman Recorded Her 200th
Skydive Before FatalJump, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 6, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL 3881112.
301. SeeJon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 671 (1999) ("[W]here a risk is perceived as
posing high costs, it tends also to be perceived as posing low benefits. .. ").
302. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 771 (2003) (re-
viewing HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich
et al., eds., Cambridge, 2002)).
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tential course of action. 30 3 Although the doctrine originally rested on
the fiction that an unwanted medical procedure was a battery, courts
eventually incorporated the obligation to educate the patient as one
aspect of the physician's overarching duty of reasonable care.304 It is
only by facilitating the plaintiffs informed choice that the physician's
actions become reasonable. Likewise, manufacturers of dangerous
products do not fit neatly into the negligence concept. Many goods-
chainsaws, prescription drugs, and household chemical cleaners, for
instance-both serve important societal functions and frequently
cause grave injuries. Again, tort law places the onus on the manufac-
turer to provide reasonable warnings about the product's risks. 30 5 In
sharp contrast to the no duty rule, these two doctrines reflect the "well
established . . . cognate notion that consent must be informed or
knowledgeable in some meaningful sense if we are to accord it legal
or moral significance. ' '30 6
303. See, e.g., Pettengill v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 380, 383 (E.D. Va. 1994) (" [T]he
doctrine of informed consent... requires physicians to 'disclose to patients the alternative
to and risks of a particular treatment."') (quoting Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Va.
1976)).
304. See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 460-61 (N.J. 1999) (while
"[t]he physician's need to obtain the consent of the patient to surgery derived from the
patient's right to reject a nonconsensual touching," many courts now believe that "the
decisive factor is not whether a treatment alternative is invasive or noninvasive, but whether
the physician adequately presents the material facts so that the patient can make an in-
formed decision."). But see Kenny v. Wepman, 753 A.2d 924, 926 (R.I. 2000) (limiting the
doctrine to surgical procedures under the battery rationale).
305. See Deviner v. Electrolux Motor, 844 F.2d 769, 773 (11 th Cir. 1988) (holding that
chainsaw manufacturer discharged its duty to warn by informing the plaintiffs employer
about its risks); Figueroa v. Boston Scientific Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 361, 371 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (finding the existence of material facts as to whether manufacturer discharged duty
to warn); Zeigler v. CloWhite Co., 507 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing trial
court's determination that maker of lemon-scented bleach had no duty to warn about its
dangerous propensities); Robert G. Knaier, Note, An Informed-Choice Duty to Instruct? Liri-
ano, Burke, and the Practical Limits of Subtle Jurisprudence, 88 CORNELL L. Rv. 814, 820
(2003) ("Warnings and instructions not only inform consumers as to how to use or con-
sume a product more safely, but also provide consumers with information from which to
decide whether to use or consume the product at all.") (italics omitted).
For example, in Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83 (Alaska 1984), a sky diver broke
his neck while using a specialty parachute with a triangular-shaped canopy that was manu-
factured by the defendant. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of
summaryjudgment for the defendant, noting that the record did not establish whether the
company had done enough to highlight the fact that the parachute was not suitable for
novice sky divers. Id. at 88.
306. Schuck, supra note 148, at 900. Of course, there are meaningful differences be-
tween medicine, dangerous products, and high-risk sports. Doctors have fiduciary relation-
ships with their patients; their decisions also directly impact a patient's physical integrity.
Product manufacturers, on the other hand, only interact at arm's length with customers.
However, as Peter Schuck argues, tort law accommodates these concerns by requiring doc-
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A. Defining "Extreme Sports"
The term "extreme sport" is "increasingly amorphous. °3 0 7 In-
deed, it has been used to describe forms of motorcycle racing,308 bull
riding,30 9 running,310 diving,311 surfing,31 2 and even pogo-stick-hop-
ping.3 13 Thus, an important threshold issue is for which recreational
activities the proposed rule should govern.
Judges already are tasked with determining which recreational ac-
tivities are "sports."31 4 Employing similar principles, courts should de-
cide which activities qualify as "extreme sports" as a matter of law. This
determination should reflect the duty to inform's objective of bring-
ing activities that are difficult to classify as reasonable back within the
ambit of the negligence concept. Thus, extreme sports should include
tors to discharge significantly more onerous duties to warn than sellers of dangerous prod-
ucts. Id. at 920-23. Indeed, doctors must discuss the risks and benefits of all possible
treatment methods, while products manufacturers may simply rely on mass-produced warn-
ings to discharge their duty of due care. Id. at 922. Thus, this Article's proposed standard
would account for the vast difference between medicine and high risks sports by holding
purveyors of such activities to a less arduous duty to inform patrons of an activity's danger.
307. Chris Baiocchi, X Marks the Spot, VILLAGE VOICE (New York), Oct. 11, 1999, at 34.
For an article chronicling the ubiquitous use of the word "extreme" in media titles, see
Tom Kuntz, Buzzwords, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at A2. Recent newspaper articles have
detailed "extreme ironing" and "extreme reading." See Cassell Bryan-Low, Extreme Ironing:
Adding New Wrinkles to an Age-Old Chore, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2003, at Al; Good Morning
America (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 2, 2003), 2003 WL 2674405 (describing people
who iron while sky diving or climbing Mount Everest); La Canada Flintridge, New Sport:
Extreme Reading, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at F2, 2003 WL 2447450. Similarly, the conserva-
tive Christian group "The Promise Keepers" dubbed their new youth-outreach movement
"extreme faith." See Karen Rivedal, Promise Keepers Down, Not Out, CHI. TRIB.,June 22, 2001,
at 1, 2001 WL 4086592. Likewise, 60,000 people attended Harvest Ministries' Summerfest,
which featured prayer and extreme sports. See Sarah Linn, God-Jest Takes Place of Crusade:
Evangelist Palau Thinks Young to Reach the Young, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2003, at 10, 2003 WL
66439451.
308. See Benjamin Olivo, Motorcycle Riders Go to Extremes in Dome, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEws, Jan 25, 2002, at H23, 2002 WL 709498.
309. See Jeff Dick, Cowboy Up: Inside the World of Bull Riding, BooKiisT, Nov. 1, 2002, at
511, 2002 WL 101221798 (reviewing CowBoy UP: INSIDE THE EXTREME WORLD OF BULL
RIDING (Lighthouse Pictures 2002)).
310. See Robert Remington, Eco-Challenge Race Takes A Toll on Competitors, NAT'L POST
(Toronto), Aug. 15, 2002, at A10, 2002 WL 24861249.
311. See Allan Laing, Widower Sets 558-Foot Diving Record, HERALD (UK), Oct. 14, 2003,
at 12, 2003 WL 65750765.
312. See Mike Wise, Hang 10!, INr'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 13, 2003, at 16, 2003 WL
64831950.
313. See Ramsey, supra note 18, at 1648 & 1648 n.36 (noting that a contestant on MTV's
'Jackass" knocked himself out on "a state of the art pogo stick that allows users to do a
double rotation").
314. See Record v. Reason, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 554-55 (Ct. App. 1999); Shannon v.
Rhodes, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 223-24 (Ct. App. 2001).
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activities like BASE jumping, which do not possess the same bundle of
virtues-exercise, teamwork, and skill-building-that make most
other sports reasonable. The extreme sports label should also extend
to activities like motocross, which exact an enormous social cost by
injuring so often. Courts should therefore define extreme sports as
recreational activities in which risk is the primary allure or those
where serious injuries occur frequently enough to cast doubt on the
sport's reasonableness. Finally, this inquiry should focus on the pre-
cise nature of the activity in question. Thus, BMX may not be an ex-
treme sport when it involves the relatively tame goal of leaping over
small objects on flat surfaces, 315 but may be an extreme sport when
offered on a course laden with moguls, obstacles, and steep
embankments. 316
B. Benefits of the Proposed Rule: Integrating Extreme Sports into
the Negligence Regime
1. Balancing Autonomy and Accident Prevention
A duty to inform would strike a better balance between individual
autonomy and accident prevention than the no duty rule. Recent
studies have legitimized risk-preference by suggesting that it has a
physiological basis. 317 In addition, researchers have discovered " [t] hat
much antisocial and self-destructive conduct springs from the wish for
sensation. '" 3 18 Preserving opportunities for recreational risk-taking
helps funnel such behavior into socially-acceptable outlets. Individuals
also possess powerful claims to further their sovereign values as they
see fit. At the same time, however, a chief purpose of the tort system is
to discourage excessively risky behavior.3 19
One manner in which the no duty rule attempts to accommodate
this tension is by determining that all sports are reasonable as a matter
of law. This approach only makes sense when applied to traditional
recreational activities, which boast tremendous social value and in
which well-established conventions limit the universe of potentially in-
jurious conduct.3 20 Extreme sports are markedly different. Yet the no
315. The sport began as such. See Clark, supra note 21.
316. This sport now generally takes this form. SeeJosh Ward, BMXEnjoys Renaissance:
Competition is Thrilling, Spot's Participants Say, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 27, 2003, at 10C,
2003 WL 17310559.
317. See supra text accompanying note 137.
318. Heidt, supra note 99, at 442.
319. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 11-12, at 19-21 (2000) (discussing
the purposes of tort law).
320. See supra Part II.A.2.
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duty rule dubiously concludes that the benefits of any sport outweigh
its risks, regardless of its particular circumstances or the characteristics
of the participant. This blanket assumption is especially problematic
in light of the fact that marketing experts predict that extreme sports
will feature an increasingly diverse clientele in coming years. 321 The
duty to inform would add a necessary disincentive to offset the height-
ened risk of injury in such activities. The ability to distinguish between
risk-preferrers, those who value sensation-seeking, and the risk-averse
will be particularly valuable as the extreme sports demographic
expands.
The no duty rule also sometimes excuses defendants from taking
safety measures that "would require that an integral part of the sport
be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in sporting
events." 322 Notably, this justification for the no duty rule does not try
to weigh autonomous interests against accident prevention at all.
However, this rationale contains a limiting principle: courts should be
able to ask defendants to take precautions that would not affect the
way a sport is played. The duty to inform is precisely that kind of step.
By merely changing vendors' pre-activity interactions with customers,
it would allow extreme sports to stay on the market in unadulterated
forms. The proposed regime would thus deter unreasonably risky con-
duct without diminishing autonomy values or altering the way danger-
ous recreational activities are conducted.
2. Providing a Sound and Reliable Basis for Barring Claims
One of the most remarkable aspects of the current state of the
law is that it manages both to be unnecessarily harsh to plaintiffs and
yet not offer vendors a predictable mechanism for barring unmeritori-
ous lawsuits. The no duty rule does not require sponsoring business
entities to take additional precautions for risky activities. At the same
time, despite the no duty rule and an arsenal of waivers and inherent
risk statutes, sponsoring businesses remain at the mercy of an area of
321. SeeJamie Doward, The World Turned Upside Down, THE OBSERVER (Eur.), Apr. 6,
2003, at P46, at 1, 2003 WL 17842328 ("'You see more and more people getting involved
because the sports continue to grow, people are starting these sports younger and advertis-
ers want that demographic.'") (statement of Melissa Gullotti, ESPN Director of Media Ser-
vices); Kellie Dixon, X Games Continuing to Mature, APnz. REP., August 16, 2003, at Cl, 2003
WL 61274413 (noting that the National Sporting Goods Association is reporting a seventy
percent increase in age twelve and under participation in skateboarding since 1992); Sarah
Treffinger, A Way of Life: People of All Ages Flock to Action Sports Looking for Speed, Fun or a
Natural High, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 7, 2003, at 1, 2003 WL 2873479.
322. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 75 P.3d 30, 38 (Cal. 2003).
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law that often generates unpredictable results. Under the proposed
rule, in the absence of additional negligence, a fully-informed ex-
treme sports participant's claim will fail. However, this result will flow
not from a perceived need to subsidize high risk sports or a mechani-
cal determination that a participant's decision to take part in the activ-
ity manifests his consent to face its dangers, but rather from the fact
that the defendant has done nothing unreasonable. Grounding the
no duty rule in the tenets of reasonableness would provide a superior
rationale for barring claims.
a. Putting the Emphasis Back on Tort's Basic Standard
The reasonableness concept dominates torts. 323 Deviations from
the rule that liability attaches when a defendant's unreasonable con-
duct proximately causes a plaintiffs injury are few and far between.3 24
Yet to the extent that the no duty rule shields defendants from the
legal consequences of an activity that would otherwise be tortious, it
subsidizes their conduct. The more the sport in question departs from
the reasonableness standard, however, the harder it becomes tojustify
such an entitlement. Indeed, it makes little sense to subsidize activities
that do not confer powerful benefits in return.
It is little wonder that courts have occasionally expressed qualms
about extending the subsidy rationale to especially dangerous sports.
For example, in Foronda v. Hawaii Intern. Boxing Club,3 2 5 a Hawaii ap-
pellate court reluctantly applied the no duty rule to a tort suit brought
against a boxing promoter for a participant's death. The court noted
that the purpose of the no duty rule was to avoid putting "burdens on
the free and vigorous participation in the sport. ' 326 Yet the court was
troubled by the "unique nature of the sport of boxing."32 7 Neverthe-
less, the court's concerns about extending the no duty rule to conduct
that "[i] n any other context ... would be ... criminal" 328 evaporated
when it considered the fact that the plaintiff was an experienced
boxer who had continued to participate after experiencing the sport's
risks first-hand. 329 Thus, one reading of Foronda is that the court ap-
323. SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Lia-
bility: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 265 (1990).
324. See Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, supra note 31, at 844.
325. 25 P.3d 826 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001).
326. Id. at 841.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 842 (noting that the plaintiff "was not a complete neophyte" who had both
been knocked out and knocked others out).
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plied the no duty rule in order to subsidize the sport of boxing. But
this interpretation is hard to square with the court's misgivings about
the activity. A better reading is that the court barred the plaintiffs
negligence claim because boxing was reasonable for him, thus making
the defendant's provision of the sport reasonable as well. 330
b. Stabilizing the Duty Not to Increase Inherent Risks Inquiry
Courts have struggled to apply the duty not to negligently in-
crease inherent risks to high risk sports because it is difficult to define
what constitutes "negligence" during the course of activities that cause
injuries so often.331 The duty to inform would solve this problem by
aligning the parties' conduct in the first instance. Under the proposed
rule, both a properly-warned plaintiffs decision to take part in a risky
sport and the defendant's facilitation of the activity would be reasona-
ble. Requiring vendors to take an additional, pre-activity safety mea-
sure would assuage some of the concerns that animated the Lamp
court, which found a motocross track owner's failure to remove a hid-
den obstacle culpable enough to constitute willful and wanton mis-
conduct. 332 Although such a lapse would still be classically negligent
conduct, a court would be less likely to assign such a high degree of
blame to a vendor that initially ensured that all participants were
aware of the incidence of accidents during the sport. Courts generally
consider a defendant's risk-creation to be less blameworthy if the de-
fendant took steps to make sure the plaintiff knew of the danger.333
Although the duty to inform would saddle sponsoring business enti-
ties with an additional obligation, it would also reduce the odds of
courts finding them guilty of gross negligence or willful and wanton
misconduct. As Lamp illustrates, vendors have strong incentives to
330. That courts are more comfortable applying a reasonableness rationale than a sub-
sidy rationale in high risk sports cases explains why they frequently highlight the plaintiff's
experience with a particular sport. For example, in Dare v. Freefall Adventures, 793 A.2d 125
(N.J. 2002), the court noted that the plaintiff had parachuted 137 times. Id. at 128. Al-
though this would have been a dispositive fact under the traditional assumption of risk
defense, see supra text accompanying note 44, it is largely irrelevant for duty analysis, which
centers on the "relationship between the parties," not the plaintiff's subjective impressions.
See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). Thus, Dare,
like Foronda, can also be explained by the fact that sky diving was reasonable for the plain-
tiff, thereby making the defendant's provision of sky diving also reasonable.
331. See supra, Part II.A.2.
332. See Lamp v. Reynolds, 645 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
333. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 3 cmt. c (2000) ("Whether
the defendant reasonably believes that the plaintiff is aware of a risk and voluntarily under-
takes it may be relevant to whether the defendant acted reasonably.").
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avoid being deemed culpable at that level because such determina-
tions override otherwise valid liability waivers. 33 4
In addition, the duty to inform would allow courts to articulate
specific criteria for what it means to negligently increase a hazardous
sport's inherent risks without sidestepping powerful fairness concerns.
Under a negligence analysis, even a vendor's minor carelessness
would create a high probability of grave injury and thus be unreasona-
ble. Branco and Dare therefore establish tests for negligence that allow
vendors to make trivial mistakes and still avoid liability, respectively
holding them to duties not to "create an extreme risk of injury"335 and
not to "materially increase" the odds of injury "beyond those reasona-
bly anticipated by skydiving participants. '-3 6 But because the no duty
rule does not impose an obligation on sponsoring business entities. to
sort out participants who would not take part in an extreme sport if
they were aware of the risk of injury, shifting the duty line in this man-
ner further immunizes unreasonable conduct from liability. By creat-
ing a trade-off whereby vendors must take an additional ex ante
precaution in return for the protection of specialized duty rules dur-
ing the course of the activity, the duty to inform would place Branco
and Dare on solid ground.
A related problem is that many extreme sports seem to be pre-
cisely what the duty not to increase inherent risks prohibits: tradi-
tional recreational activities that have been modified to accentuate
their dangerous attributes. However, while the duty not to increase
inherent risks forbids a vendor's operational negligence, it apparently
does not proscribe intentionally increasing a sport's inherent risks. Not
accounting for intentional risk-creation allows a great deal of risky
conduct to go undeterred. Thus, the no duty rule distinguishes be-
tween reasonable and unreasonable mascot behavior at a baseball
game 337 and reasonable and unreasonable signpost placement on a
ski run. 338 Yet it treats skateboarding as a singular enterprise, whether
it takes place on the street or a skate-park's half-pipe-a U-shaped
ramp where an accident is like 'jumping off of a four-story build-
ing. 339 The duty to inform would take these shifting levels of risk into
334. Id.
335. Branco v. Kearny Moto Park, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 398 (Ct. App. 1995).
336. Dare v. Freefall Adventures, 793 A.2d 125, 133 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
337. See Lowe v. Cal. League of Prof I Baseball, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 111-12 (Ct. App.
1997).
338. See Van Dyke v. S.K.I. Ltd., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 779 (Ct. App. 1998).
339. Gina Piccalo, Scare Masters, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at El (statement of Dan
Colburn, co-founder of socalskateparks.com). Indeed, skateboarding achieved modest
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account by letting participants make informed choices between a
sport's myriad of forms. Within a few parameters, 340 a participant's
informed consent should make a sport with intentionally increased
risks reasonable. In addition, by instituting disclosure requirements,
the duty to inform would discourage the risk-averse from participating
in activities with intentionally-increased risks.
c. Resolving Minors' Claims
The conflict between contractual protections enjoyed by minors
and primary assumption of risk means that vendors in some jurisdic-
tions cannot bar the claims of child plaintiffs.341 Courts in other states
seem to recognize this tension on an intuitive level.342 This subsection
contends that the duty to inform would solve this problem. However,
a doctrinal caveat is necessary: a sponsoring business entity must pro-
vide information to both a minor and his parents to discharge its legal
obligation. Because the duty to inform assumes that participants will
make choices that effectuate their internal cost-benefit balancing, re-
quiring parental approval would avoid placing this decision in the
hands of individuals who may be incapable of fully understanding the
ramifications of their decision. 343
Courts should insist upon parental approval even in jurisdictions
that do not allow parents to waive a child's tort claim. 344 Without such
a system, sponsoring business entities in some states would have no
means whatsoever to combat tort claims. 345 In addition, the rule that
parents cannot waive a child's tort claim touches upon a general dis-
trust of liability releases. Seizing upon defects in language or presenta-
tion, courts often invalidate waivers even in light of clear evidence that
the plaintiff knew the legal effect of the document.3 46 Underlying
popularity in the 1970s as a street-based sport. Eventually, participants began skating in
abandoned swimming pools. SeeJenkins, supra note 23.
340. Of course, some activities, like Russian roulette, may be so far removed from fur-
thering values that society is prepared to recognize that, even with informed consent, they
will not be reasonable.
341. See supra Part II.B.
342. See supra Part II.B.
343. See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 276, at 801.
344. See supra text accompanying note 101.
345. See supra Part II.B.
346. Indeed, "'[i]t is the outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party's
unexpressed intention, which the court will enforce."' Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 29
Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 180 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Winet v. Price, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 557 (Ct.
App. 1992)); see also Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 634 (Alaska 2001) (hold-
ing that an issue of material fact remained whether all-terrain-vehicle student's injury re-
sulted from negligence); Mauldin v. Coupe, No. C041511, 2003 WL 22430206, at *6-*7
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these decisions is a reluctance to place too much significance on an
agreement not to sue. For many people, recourse to the courts is an
abstraction, easily surrendered. However, a decision reached by a par-
ent and a child in concert to face a particular sport's specific, enumer-
ated hazards is more meaningful than a parent's release of a child's
tort claim. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent in forbidding parents
from waiving a child's tort claim but giving legal effect to the child's
fully-informed decision, with parental imprimatur, to take part in an
activity.
In turn, the duty to inform would become the cornerstone of a
far more forceful doctrine. The current implied consent justification
for primary assumption of risk posits that any time an individual par-
ticipates in a sport, he agrees "to take his chances."3 47 Yet commenta-
tors have long complained that "the nature of this 'agreement' is
woefully ambiguous.' ' 348 The unacceptable level of generality at which
the consensual rationale for the no duty rule operates may explain its
ineffectiveness when applied to minors.3 49 High risk sports compound
the problem: it is one thing to "take chances" with bumps and bruises
and another thing entirely to "take chances" with serious injury or
death. The duty to inform would substitute a far more specific in-
quiry-whether the plaintiff chooses to engage in an activity despite
knowing how frequently injuries occur-for the vague notion of con-
sent upon which the current doctrine rests. As such, the no duty rule
would become a far more significant doctrine: one that judges may
apply in good conscience to plaintiffs of all ages.
3. Facilitating Fault Comparison
When a vendor's negligence injures an otherwise non-negligent
extreme sports participant, the no duty rule forces courts to choose
between two flawed options. First, courts can let juries reduce the
plaintiff's recovery under secondary reasonable assumption of risk.
This approach does violence to basic tort principles. 350 In fact, it is
exactly backward: a plaintiffs decision to engage in a risky sport en-
dangers only himself, while a sponsoring business entity's provision of
the sport imperils many others. Courts can also allow the plaintiff to
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct 27, 2003) (concluding that motocross track operator's release was too
wordy and complex to be enforced).
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c (1) (1965).
348. Simons, Full Preference, supra note 4, at 227.
349. See supra text Part II.B.
350. See supra text Part II.A.3.
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recover full damages. Because the plaintiff has consciously decided to
gamble with his physical integrity, however, this approach seems
inequitable.
This unfortunate dichotomy is a result of the fact that the law
currently forges no relationship between a sponsoring business en-
tity's efforts to discharge its legal obligation and the reasonableness of
the plaintiffs decision to engage in a dangerous sport. The no duty
rule frames a defendant's task in negative terms: not to increase risks.
A vendor may diligently fulfill this responsibility or completely disre-
gard it. Either way, the defendant's actions have no bearing on the
culpability of the plaintiff's choice to take part in the activity. Juries in
states that allow damage reduction based on risky but not unreasona-
ble conduct will thus always be forced to compare two different forms
of behavior, each conducted in a vacuum. Quantifying and comparing
the blameworthiness of a vendor's design choices or operational con-
duct and an individual's predilection for risk will always possess a dis-
tasteful ad hoc quality.
The duty to inform would bridge this gap by placing the parties'
behavior on a continuum. Indeed, the degree to which a defendant
discharges its duty would directly impact the reasonableness of a plain-
tiff's decision to participate in the activity. Under the cost-benefit defi-
nition of reasonableness, both a vendor that provides insufficient
warnings and a plaintiff who would not have engaged in a sport if he
had been fully aware of its risks are negligent. Examining a single in-
teraction and determining which party should bear the lion's share of
responsibility is a far more sensible manner of apportioning fault than
letting a jury reduce a plaintiffs recovery for risky but not unreasona-
ble conduct.
B. Counterarguments
1. The Duty to Inform Is Too Burdensome
This proposal may inconvenience vendors. However, sponsoring
business entities could implement reasonable warnings with minimal
hassle. Indeed, virtually every extreme sports company makes patrons
sign liability releases. 351 Vendors could thus fulfill their legal obliga-
tion by printing data about injury rates in the specific sport in a prom-
inent place on waivers. Also, many companies already take great pains
to reinforce the fact that the plaintiff has agreed not to sue. Some sky
diving outfits require participants to watch a presentation in which an
351. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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attorney explains the legal effect of a waiver. 352 Vertical Visions makes
BASE jumpers swear on video tape that both they and their estate will
hold the company harmless. 353 Rather than thrusting upon vendors
an additional responsibility, the proposed regime would thus merely
ask them to recalibrate steps that they already often take.
2. Complications with Fault Comparison
One might object that under the proposed rule, if a vendor does
discharge its duty to inform, but nevertheless engages in unreasonable
conduct during the course of the activity, the plaintiff should recover
in full. However, if the vendor does not fulfill its duty to inform and is
negligent during the course of the activity, the jury has free reign to
reduce the plaintiff's damages under comparative fault. This creates
perverse incentives.
But this issue is a chimera. It is extremely doubtful that a sponsor-
ing business entity would deliberately fail to inform a patron of an
activity's risks in order to create the potential for fault comparison.
Because defense costs can be high,354 vendors have much stronger
incentives to stay out of court completely than attempt to mitigate the
plaintiff's potential comparative fault recovery. Moreover, ajury would
not likely look kindly upon such efforts and allocate a greater share of
damages in response.
3. Fear of Greater Liability
Another concern is that, under the proposed rule, a fully-in-
formed extreme sports participant who is injured by a vendor's negli-
gence has behaved "reasonably" in the eyes of the law and should
recover full damages. This could increase a vendor's liability expo-
sure. But it does not follow that every plaintiff who is injured by a
vendor's negligence would automatically recover his entire share of
damages. Participants could still engage in behavior during the course
of the activity that deviates from informal norms and is thus deemed
unreasonable. For example, two motocross riders at the 2003 X
Games were injured while attempting stunts that had previously never
352. See Manning v. Brannon, 956 P.2d 156, 157 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997) (noting that
the plaintiff underwent six hours of training, including viewing the video tape and signing
the exculpatory contract in fourteen places); Moore, supra note 271 (profiling a sky diving
company that makes participants watch a video that explains the liability waiver they must
sign).
353. See O'Donnell, supra note 98, at 4.
354. See Heidt, supra note 99, at 392.
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been successfully completed. 355 Likewise, some sky diving companies
ask participants not to engage in a maneuver called "swooping," in
which a participant quickly decelerates before landing, allowing him
to glide over the ground at high speed. 356 Participants who engage in
such conduct would have their damages reduced. In addition, in
states with "modified" comparative fault systems, under which a plain-
tiff must be found less culpable than the defendant to receive dam-
ages in the first place, 357 juries could find such behavior sufficiently
blameworthy to bar recovery.
To receive any damages, a plaintiff must also prove that a defen-
dant's breach of duty caused his harm .358 Reconsider the facts of Dare
v. Freefall Adventures.3 59 Before his accident, the plaintiff had para-
chuted 137 times. 360 If the sky diving company had failed to provide
reasonable warnings, it would still have a meritorious argument that
the plaintiff would have engaged in the sport regardless of the
amount of information he received. Because risk-preferrers and re-
peat players tend to participate in risky sports habitually, causation
would be a potent weapon to mitigate claims that a sponsoring busi-
ness entity breached its duty to inform.
Thus, even though some extreme sports participants would re-
cover full damages under the duty to inform, it is unlikely that it
would greatly increase vendors' liabilities.
4. The Duty to Inform Would Increase Defense Costs
This Article has argued above that the duty to inform would only
affect sponsoring business entities' liability in a narrow band of
cases-generally where a plaintiff has little experience with the activity
in question. However, by giving plaintiffs another basis to allege that a
defendant has been negligent, the proposed rule might increase the
number of tort claims, thus increasing potentially ruinous defense
costs. Yet, although negligence questions are generally for the jury,
355. See Peter Yoon, Big Air Final Tests Limits, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 2003, at D13. Simi-
larly, Travis Pastrana claims that "[e]very time I've gotten hurt.., has been my fault." Motor
Sport, supra note 2.
356. See Nathaniel McGrath, Skydivers Come to Mid America Sport Parachute Club to take a
flying Leap, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Apr. 7, 2002, at 13, 2002 WL 9746087; see also
Christine Dempsey, Parachute Landing Goes Awry: Manchester Man, 34, Dies Early Today,
HARTcORDt CouRANT, July 19, 2002, at B1, 2002 WL 24223657 ("High performance landings
are becoming popular, but even some experts believe they are dangerous ... .
357. See Horton, supra note 4, at 350 n.5.
358. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 63, at 341.
359. 793 A.2d 125, 128-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
360. Id. at 128.
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some states let courts make such determinations as a matter of law in
the sports setting. 36' If states are willing to entrust appellate judges
with intensely fact-specific questions on cold records, then they should
also allow judges to consider whether vendors have taken adequate
steps to inform patrons of a sport's risks as a matter of law. Courts will
often be able to examine the document and its exact language be-
cause sponsoring business entities will presumably memorialize warn-
ings on waivers, videotape, or other tangible forms. Accordingly, the
proposed rule would not necessarily transform every extreme sports-
related accident into an issue for the jury. This would be in keeping
with one of the no duty rule's main purposes: encouraging summary
judgment in appropriate cases.3 6 2 It would also limit the number of
cases that proceed to trial, alleviating the financial burden on recrea-
tional vendors.
Conclusion
The extreme sports movement continues to gather momentum.
This penchant for recreational risk-taking may be the defining charac-
teristic of an entire generation of young people. Many believe that it
will change the face of recreation forever and become a fertile source
of litigation. Yet, at a time when clarity and certainty in the law is vital,
tort law stands in disarray. The doctrine of assumption of risk, a high
risk sport purveyor's foremost defense against lawsuits, has long been
marred by conceptual confusion. What once was a single rule has now
splintered into a host of doctrines, none of which provide a predict-
able mechanism for defeating a plaintiff's claims.
Assumption of risk's current incarnation holds defendants to no
duty to protect plaintiffs from a sport's inherent risks. Yet this rule is a
relic of a time when "sports" were well-established activities with indis-
putable social value and limited dangers. Indeed, courts have offered
three rationales for the no duty rule, none of which seem to justify
applying it to high risk sports. Some courts believe that the no duty
rule stems from the fact that sports are inherently reasonable. How-
361. See, e.g., Estes v. Tripson, 932 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (holding as a
matter of law that base-runner was not negligent for sliding into catcher in softball game);
Allen v. Dover Co-Recreational Softball League, 807 A.2d 1274, 1287 (N.H. 2002) (finding
no breach of duty as a matter of law).
362. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 706 (Cal. 1992) (plurality opinion) (If assump-
tion of risk was a jury question, "summary judgment rarely would be available" because "it
frequently will be easy to raise factual questions with regard to a particular plaintiffs sub-
jective expectations as to the existence and magnitude of the risks the plaintiff voluntarily
chose to encounter.") (italics omitted).
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ever, extreme sports are impossible to categorize as either reasonable
or unreasonable. Other courts opine that the no duty rule is necessary
to avoid changing sports through safety regulation. Nevertheless, to
the extent that the no duty rule allows sponsoring business entities to
avoid liability for conduct that would otherwise be tortious, it raises
the question of why society should subsidize activity that often lacks
the same benefits-exercise, competition, and skill-building-that
characterize traditional sports. Still other jurisdictions adhere to the
notion that the plaintiffs implied consent to face certain dangers
frees defendants from a legal obligation to eliminate them. But be-
cause children cannot waive liability by contract, it is not clear why
courts should allow them to implicitly do so through the no duty rule.
Indeed, no matter what version of the no duty rule a state follows,
courts seem reluctant to bar the claims of minor plaintiffs. Finally, the
no duty rule problematizes fault comparison by forcing states to de-
cide whether to let risk-preferring plaintiffs recover in full or reduce
their damages based on behavior that is not necessarily unreasonable.
This Article proposes a way out of this labyrinth. Holding vendors
to an additional duty to inform patrons of an extreme sport's risks
would allow them to cater solely to those for whom the benefits of
such activity outweigh its risks. It would also make the act of providing
a high risk sport reasonable itself as a matter of law. In turn, incorpo-
rating high risk sports into the reasonableness concept would bring
such activities back in line with the no duty rule's underlying assump-
tions. It would also reinstitute negligence as the benchmark of fault
comparison. Finally, courts would likely be more comfortable apply-
ing a rule that focuses on a more robust form of consent than the
current doctrine-one that finds legal significance in a plaintiffs
fully-informed decision to engage in an activity rather than just any
decision, informed or otherwise. Thus, the duty to inform would both
provide vendors with a dependable means of defense and incorporate
the fairness concerns that lurk beneath the surface of the current
rule's doctrinal instability. In this manner, courts could bring order to
an important area of law that has been long reviled as a sprawling
mess.
[Vol. 38
